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BANISHMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS: LIBERTY, 
PROTECTIONISM, JUSTICE, AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
SHELLEY ROSS SAXER

 
ABSTRACT 
Although most sex offenses are committed by relatives or 
acquaintances of the victims, our public policy approach has been to focus 
on the stranger sex offender and punish sex offenders through residency 
restrictions. These residency restrictions effectively banish these locally 
undesirable and dangerous individuals from our communities in fear that 
they may reoffend in our neighborhoods. Rather than being thrust into 
some wilderness, sex offenders are “banished” to neighboring counties or 
states
 
and into poor, minority neighborhoods where they often live in 
boarding houses with other sex offenders. 
Banishing sex offenders through these residential restrictions impacts 
individual liberty, our national structure, and social policy considerations. 
This Article offers a legal analysis of the adverse impacts these 
restrictions impose on the constitutional rights of both sex offenders and 
our communities, which for economic or political limitations do not have 
the appropriate representation to mitigate these consequences. This 
Article also examines what methods from the environmental justice 
movement might be available to deal with the “social justice” issue of sex 
offenders disproportionately burdening poor, minority communities. 
Finally, because there is not yet evidence to support the efficacy of 
residency restrictions on sex offender recidivism,
 
this Article concludes 
that legislators should reexamine the current trend of using residency 
restrictions to address concerns about sex offender recidivism. Instead, 
public policy decision makers should look toward alternatives, such as 
individualized risk assessment and management of these individuals, so 
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that public resources can be properly directed to confine, monitor, and 
treat those sex offenders most likely to commit serious reoffenses. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Banishment is ―a form of punishment imposed on an individual, 
usually by a country or state, in which the individual is forced to remain 
outside of that country or state.‖1 It is also a traditional criminal sentence 
used by Native American tribes, to expel an offender ―for the protection of 
the community.‖2 Although most of us may think of banishment as archaic 
 
 
 1. American Law Encyclopedia, Banishment—Further Readings, http://law.jrank.org/pages/ 
4646/Banishment.html (last visited May 13, 2009). 
 2. PAWNEE TRIBE OF OKLA. LAW AND ORDER CODE tit. V, § 404(a) (2005), available at 
http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/pawneecode/crimproc.htm (defining banishment as ―the traditional and 
customary sentence imposed by the Tribe for offenders who have been convicted of offenses which 
violate the basic rights to life, liberty, and property of the community and whose violation is a gross 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/3
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or tribal, it is still used in some states as punishment,
3
 and it appears to be 
the underlying basis of some of the recent legislation attempting to protect 
society against sex offenders.
4
 About two dozen states and hundreds of 
local governments have created legislation to exclude sex offenders from 
living within proscribed areas around schools, parks, day care centers, or 
areas where children are known to congregate.
5 
Part I of this Article views 
state and local exclusionary residence laws in the context of banishment, 
as it was historically understood, and explores how courts and policy 
makers view this concept as applied to sex offenders. 
Recent cases have shown that courts are upholding the constitutionality 
of such restrictions,
6
 although the Georgia Supreme Court struck down 
such a restriction on the constitutional ground that Georgia‘s law operates 
as a regulatory taking of property without just compensation.
7
 Part II 
briefly discusses the major constitutional challenges to these residency 
restrictions. It also examines the potential challenges to private restrictive 
covenants created to exclude sex offenders from moving into privately 
controlled residential areas.  
The practical effect of banishment on a national level must be 
understood in the context that there are few places in modern-day America 
to which a sex offender may be banished that are isolated from the rest of 
society. Rather than being excluded and thrust into some undeveloped 
wilderness, sex offenders are banished through residency restrictions to 
 
 
violation of the peace and safety of the Tribe requiring the person to be totally expelled for the 
protection of the community‖).  
 3. See infra Part I.B. 
 4. But see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719–20 (8th Cir. 2005) (concluding Iowa statute which 
restricts the residency of sex offenders is not analogous to banishment and not punitive). 
 5. See Sarah Geraghty, Challenging the Banishment of Registered Sex Offenders from the State 
of Georgia: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 515 (2007) (noting that 
―[a]t least twenty-seven states and numerous municipalities‖ have restricted the residency of sex 
offenders); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2670–71 (2008); Jill Levenson et al., Sex 
Offender Residence Restrictions: Sensible Crime Policy or Flawed Logic?, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 
2007, at 2; Wayne A Logan, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (2006); Caleb Durling, Comment, Never Going Home: Does it Make us Safer? 
Does it Make Sense? Sex Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317 (2006). For a sampling of state residency restriction statutes, see 
infra note 75. 
 6. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 106 (2003) (finding Alaska‘s sex offender registration 
and notification laws nonpunitive and for the protection of the public); Miller, 405 F.3d at 718–19 
(holding that Iowa‘s police power could be used to establish residency restrictions for sex offenders, 
and such was a valid state purpose and furthered the health and safety of Iowa‘s citizens); State v. 
Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 670–71 (Iowa 2005) (upholding the same Iowa statute as constitutional). 
 7. Mann v. Ga. Dep‘t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Ga. 2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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neighboring counties or states
8
 and into poor, minority neighborhoods 
where they often live in boarding houses with other sex offenders.
9
 
Banishment also brings with it federalism concerns similar to those that 
arise when states or municipalities attempt to exclude hazardous waste 
disposal from within the state. Such protectionist legislation has been the 
fodder of many lawsuits claiming Dormant Commerce Clause violations.
10
 
Judicial and legislative efforts to banish sex offenders to other states may 
also run afoul of Dormant Commerce Clause principles, which operate to 
discourage states from such protectionist activities. Part III explores the 
nationalism concerns under the Dormant Commerce Clause when 
residency restrictions at the state and local levels ―dump‖ sex offenders 
into neighboring jurisdictions.  
Disproportionate siting of sex offenders into poor neighborhoods of 
color is a social disaster. These neighborhoods are often characterized by 
dense living conditions and less parental supervision, providing ample 
opportunity for convicted offenders to reoffend.
11
 This overconcentration 
of offenders may also result in lowered property values and other adverse 
community impacts.
12
 The federal government addressed a similar issue 
when studies in the late 1980s reported that hazardous waste sites were 
being placed near poor and primarily minority neighborhoods. In 1994, 
 
 
 8. See Logan, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that both state and local governments have shown 
interest in residency restrictions and ―localities in jurisdictions adjacent to states with exclusion laws, 
fearful of an influx of sex offenders, have seized the initiative and enacted their own laws‖). 
 9. See infra note 224 and accompanying text. In the aftermath of Megan‘s Law, the California 
Department of Justice currently provides a public website allowing any person to search for registered 
sex offenders living in any area of California. Office of the Attorney General, Megan‘s Law Home, 
http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov (last visited May 13, 2009). A brief review of several southern 
California areas reveals that there are disproportionately more registered sex offenders living in poor 
and minority neighborhoods than in middle- or upper-class neighborhoods. Among the lower class 
neighborhoods, East Los Angeles (notorious for both poverty and crime) yielded the highest number of 
registered offenders in a single zip code with seventy-seven registered offenders. A close second was 
Fontana, having 197 registered sex offenders living within its five zip codes. Finally, Chino, spanning 
two zip codes, serves as a home to forty-five registered sex offenders. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the affluent neighborhood of Rancho Santa Margarita in Orange County reported zero 
registered sex offenders within its zip code. Moreover, La Cañada and Pacific Palisades showed a 
combined three registered sex offenders in three zip codes. Arcadia, a middle-class community located 
twenty miles east of downtown Los Angeles, recorded only twelve hits in four zip codes. The figures, 
although not comprehensive, tend to show that sex offenders are congregating in poorer 
neighborhoods. 
 10. See infra notes 179–221 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Emerging 
Legal and Research Issues, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 337, 344–45 (2003) (noting that websites 
used to notify communities about sex offender registrants are problematic in poorer communities, 
which may not have access to the Internet, and in which ―registrants tend to cluster given the greater 
availability of affordable housing‖). 
 12. See infra notes 250–59 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/3
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President Bill Clinton tried to remedy the problem with Executive Order 
12,898, which required all federal agencies to consider, as a factor, the 
―disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and 
low-income populations.‖13 In addition to the public policy approaches 
taken to resolve environmental justice concerns, the Fair Housing Act has 
been considered an important litigation tool to address this indirect racism. 
Part IV examines what methods from the environmental justice movement 
might be available to deal with this social justice issue of sex offenders 
disproportionately burdening the unwary in poor minority communities.
14
 
The banishment of sex offenders through residential restrictions, 
whether legislative or private, impacts individual liberty, the division of 
power between states and the federal government, and social policy 
considerations. This Article offers a legal analysis of the adverse impact 
these restrictions impose on the constitutional rights of the sex offenders 
and the rights of communities to which they have been effectively 
banished, which because of economic or political limitations lack the 
appropriate representation to mitigate these consequences. Finally, 
because ―there is no evidence to support the efficacy of broadly-applied 
residential restrictions on sex offenders,‖15 Part V briefly addresses 
alternative approaches to deal with concerns about sex offender 
recidivism.  
I. BANISHMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 
A. The Problem of Sex Offenders in Society 
No one wants a sex offender or child molester living in his or her 
neighborhood. In this Article, the author has classified these individuals as 
Locally Undesirable and Dangerous Individuals (LUDIs), coining this 
phrase to indicate a similarity to those noxious land uses aptly named 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses (LULUs).
16
 However, just as noxious land 
uses have varying degrees of danger, as in the case of a toxic waste site 
 
 
 13. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).  
 14. For a brief explanation of how environmental justice is a response to indirect racism, see 
infra note 226 and accompanying text. 
 15. Richard Tewksbury, Exile At Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex 
Offender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 539 (2007) (quoting Am. Corr. 
Ass‘n, Resolution on Neighborhood Exclusion of Predatory Sex Offenders (Jan. 24, 2007)). 
 16. See Logan, supra note 5, at 10 (observing that residency restriction laws ―share an obvious 
common motivation with other types of Not in My Backyard (―NIMBY‖) legislation‖ and that these 
types of ―efforts to exclude socially undesirable individuals‖ are historically grounded). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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versus a municipal waste site, sex offenders may also be classified into 
different levels to indicate the risk associated with their behavior. The 
violent sexual predators, at the highest risk level to the community, would 
be roughly equivalent in degree to the presence of a nearby toxic waste 
site. Those offenders with a lesser sexual offense on record, such as 
indecent exposure, may still be of concern to the community, but generate 
a less adverse reaction similar to a community‘s desire to avoid a 
municipal waste siting. Communities and legislators have struggled to 
cope with concerns about the presence of these individuals in their 
neighborhoods after they have been released from prisons or other 
institutions.
17
 
Relatively little is known about sex offenders and how best to deal with 
them through treatment and the criminal justice system.
18
 There is not 
agreement among the experts as to whether there is an efficacious sex 
offender treatment model.
19 
More research, and the communication of 
these research results from professionals, needs to occur so that the public 
and the policy makers understand that most sex offenders will return to the 
community and that risk assessment, treatment, and management options 
should be considered from a science-based approach rather than an 
emotionally charged approach.
20
 
One major concern about these undesirable individuals is that they will 
reoffend and that the recidivism rate is higher for sex offenders than it is 
for other criminals.
21
 Recent studies have shown that sexual recidivism is 
indeed a concern, as cumulative recidivism rates increase with time, even 
 
 
 17. See, e.g., Tucker Carlson, The Child Molester Next Door, No One Wants Released Offenders, 
BALT. SUN, June 18, 1995, at 1F (discussing ex-felon who abducted, tortured, raped, and strangled an 
eight-year-old girl within months after being released from prison, where he served only five years of a 
twenty-year sentence). 
 18. See Laurie O. Robinson, Sex Offender Management: The Public Policy Challenges, 989 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 1, 3 (2003); see also Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, What We Know and 
Don’t Know About Treating Adult Sex Offenders, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY 
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 101, 103 (Bruce J. Winick & John Q. LaFond 
eds., 2003) (stating that ―there are too few well-controlled studies of sex offender treatment to conduct 
an informative meta-analysis‖). 
 19. See Eric S. Janus, Treatment and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, in PROTECTING 
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 
119, 121 (noting that some have an optimistic outlook about the efficacy of treatment while others 
have found there to be no evidence showing that treatment can reduce recidivism); see also R. Karl 
Hanson et al., Sexual Offender Recidivism Risk: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 989 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 154, 162 (2003) (―[R]esearchers and policymakers have yet to reach 
consensus on whether treatment effectively reduces sexual recidivism.‖). 
 20. See Robinson, supra note 18, at 3–4. 
 21. See Rice & Harris, supra note 18, at 102 (noting that ―the ultimate goal of sex offender 
treatment is the reduction of recidivism‖); but see infra note 291 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/3
  
 
 
 
 
2009] BANISHMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS 1403 
 
 
 
 
though individual offenders are less likely to recidivate the longer they 
remain offense-free in the community.
22
 Unfortunately, there do not 
appear to be any published studies of sex offender recidivism that have 
shown treatments which have the ―substantial ability to lower recidivism‖ 
rates.
23 
In fact, some have concluded that sexual deviance and aggressive 
behavior ―can be attributed to genetically and physiologically based 
enduring traits that, once initiated, exhibit life-long persistence.‖24 
Another difficulty with addressing sex offending through public policy 
is that much of the public outcry and legislative action has resulted ―from 
widely publicized heinous sex crimes committed by stranger offenders‖ 
rather than from the more prevalent victimizations that occur through 
incest and violations by a trusted authority figure.
25 
More than ninety 
percent of sex crimes against children are committed by fathers, 
stepfathers, relatives, and acquaintances, rather than by the strangers.
26
 In 
fact, the percentage of nonstranger molestations may be even higher as the 
majority of this type of sexual abuse is not reported and/or prosecuted.
27 
Therefore, current legislation and public awareness focusing on the 
stranger may keep us from addressing solutions that would aid the 
majority of victims.
28
 Educating parents and children about this higher risk 
from family members and acquaintances, along with teaching better 
communication skills about uncomfortable topics, may better protect our 
children against traumatic abuse than concentrating on legislation to 
protect them against strangers.
29 
 
 
 
 22. See Hanson et al., supra note 19, at 154–57. It has been predicted that ―the ‗typical‘ sexual 
offender has a 20% chance of reoffending,‖ but that the actual cumulative recidivism rate may be in 
the range of 35–55% over a twenty-year period. Id. at 155, 157. 
 23. Grant T. Harris & Marie E. Rice, Actuarial Assessment of Risk Among Sex Offenders, 989 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 198, 207 (2003). 
 24. Id. at 208; see also id. (concluding that ―[u]ntil treatment efficacy is demonstrated, the best 
that clinicians can do is to carefully assess risk and manage offenders accordingly, while continuing 
the search for effective interventions‖). 
 25. Leonore M. J. Simon, Matching Leal Policies with Known Offenders, in PROTECTING 
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 
149, 149–50. 
 26. See id. at 150. 
 27. See id. While this estimate may have some margin for error, most studies have found similar 
percentages. See Durling, supra note 5, at 329–32. 
 28. See Simon, supra note 25, at 150 (noting that this ―focus on the stranger offender belies the 
danger and harm posed by offenses committed by nonstrangers‖ which has a more devastating impact 
on victims ―because of the betrayal of a trusted relationship‖). 
 29. See id. at 156; see also Jessica Coomes, Residency Plan Targets Sex Offenders, THE ARIZ. 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 16, 2007, available at http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special12/articles/0316 
offender-buffer0316.html (quoting Nancy Sabin, executive director of the Jacob Wetterling 
Foundation, a victim advocacy organization in Minnesota, as saying ―[a] national hysteria about sex 
offenders has led to illogical public policy that has not been proven to make children safer‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Society and the law must deal with the dangers of sex offenders while 
making sure that justice is done and constitutional constraints are 
observed.
30
 In addition to criminal confinement, the three main legal 
mechanisms employed to deal with sex offenders in the last twenty years 
are identification and registration, restrictions on the location for housing 
and employment, and civil commitment.
31
 Identification and registration 
systems requiring community notification as to the location of LUDIs 
were enacted nationwide during the 1990s in response to a number of 
high-profile sexual predator victimizations.
32
 Megan‘s Law was enacted 
on a federal level in 1996 to encourage states to protect the public through 
sex offender registration and community notification.
33
 Civil sex offender 
commitment laws have also received renewed support in the 1990s as we 
have become frustrated with the ability of the criminal justice system to 
keep sex offenders from reoffending.
34 
However, this approach has been 
criticized since the goal of these laws is ―‗to incapacitate sex offenders and 
to reduce recidivism‘‖ and the criminal system may be better equipped to 
meet such confinement expectations
35
 within constitutional constraints 
requiring treatment.
36
 
In recent years, sex offender laws have been directed at reducing 
recidivism risk by offender confinement, notice to potential victims, and 
expulsion. It appears that  
these new policies transfer the risk to two groups—sex offenders 
themselves, who may face permanent confinement or the risks of 
public lynching,
 
and the individual citizens, community 
organizations, and families, who are expected to police themselves 
 
 
 30. See Stephen J. Morse, Bad or Mad?: Sex Offenders and Social Control, in PROTECTING 
SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 
180, 180 (concluding that ―[a]lthough there are inevitable and difficult trade-offs in a free society 
between liberty and safety, a robust moral model robustly applied to sex offenders provides the 
greatest potential to achieve both justice and safety‖). 
 31. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 32. Logan, supra note 11, at 337. 
 33. Megan‘s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 
(2000)) (providing for public disclosure of detailed information on the whereabouts of registered sex 
offenders). 
 34. W. Lawrence Fitch & Debra A. Hammen, The New Generation of Sex Offender Commitment 
Laws: Which States Have Them and How Do They Work, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY 
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 27, 27–28. 
 35. Id. at 36 (quoting COMM. TO STUDY SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS, REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE TO STUDY SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS 2 (1999)). 
 36. See Janus, supra note 19, at 119–20. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/3
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against sex offenders—with the role of the state reduced to that of 
facilitating protection through warnings.
37  
Unintended consequences may result from these new policies by causing 
sex offenders to encounter extreme difficulty in finding housing and 
employment.
38
 Evidence is not yet available to indicate whether existing 
residency restrictions are effective to prevent recidivism. In fact, a 2007 
study by the Minnesota Department of Corrections indicated that the 
major factor in sexual recidivism was the social relationship with the 
victim, not the residential proximity of the sex offender to the victim.
39
 
Although the alternative solutions will be briefly discussed in Part V, the 
focus of this Article is on the residential restriction approach, which 
attempts to exile or banish sex offenders from specific communities rather 
than identify or confine them.
40
 
B. Banishment as an Alternative to Incarceration 
Banishment was originally an effective punishment because it not only 
forced the offender to live in harsh physical conditions in the wilderness, 
but it also created emotional hardship by removing the offender from the 
support of family, neighbors, and the community.
41
 Today, this 
 
 
 37. Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, in 
PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, 
supra note 18, at 301, 314; see Patt Morrison, Megan’s Law of Unintended Consequences, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A27, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2007/dec/13/opinion/oe-
morrison13 (discussing vigilante case where a convicted rapist was killed by a fellow resident in a 
trailer park who was worried about the offender attacking his son after reading about his neighbor as a 
registered sex offender); see, e.g., Brandon Bain & Erik German, How a Cluster Grew So Large: Low 
Rents, Willing Landlords and Politics Play Roles, NEWSDAY.COM, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.news 
day.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-lisex264906969sep26,0,3948394.story?coll=ny-leadnational 
news-headlines (noting that a local man ―was charged with attempted murder and attempted arson in 
an alleged plot to burn down the house [of sex offenders] and kill its occupants‖). 
 38. Michael Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 
DRAKE L. REV. 711, 714–15 (2005). 
 39. See Levenson et al., supra note 5, at 2–3; see also Pamela Foohey, Note, Conversation: GPS 
Monitoring of Domestic Violence Offenders: Applying the Lessons of GPS Monitoring of Batterers to 
Sex Offenders, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 281, 283 (2008) (noting that ―according to critics, 
residency restrictions do nothing to deter sex offenders from re-offending‖). 
 40. Brady Dennis & Matthew Waite, Where Is a Sex Offender to Live?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
May 15, 2005, at A1 (quoting Miami resident as saying, ―I don‘t really care where they live,‖ and ―[a]t 
this point I don‘t care if they live out of civilization‖). 
 41. See American Law Encyclopedia, supra note 1. While banishment may take on many forms, 
at its core it involves three elements: (1) ―expulsion in fact of a person from a community‖; (2) 
―banishment . . . to a non-institutional setting‖; and (3) ―banishment is intended to sever ties to a 
community.‖ Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex 
Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 134 (2007). 
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punishment may still result in emotional hardship because of the removal 
from a particular community; however, the offender may more easily 
move into another unsuspecting community, without the hardship of living 
in the wilderness.
42
 Thus, ―[o]ne community‘s exile becomes the 
neighboring community‘s problem.‖43 In 1930, the Michigan Supreme 
Court ruled in People v. Baum
44
 ―that citizens of the United States cannot 
be ‗dumped‘ or exiled upon sister states and that interstate banishment is 
disruptive of the Union and against public policy.‖45 Some states, such as 
California, have continued to follow the Baum decision and have 
determined that, just as a state could not banish a criminal to another state, 
a county or city could not suspend a judgment of imprisonment based on a 
condition that the defendant leave a particular county and stay away for a 
period of time.
46
 Several states have explicit constitutional provisions or 
statutes prohibiting or restricting the exile of citizens.
47
 
―Banishment has a long history in Western societies,‖ which have 
utilized expulsion, prison colonies, and internal exile.
48
 Modern 
banishment examples illustrate how this mechanism has been used to 
accomplish various purposes, including punishment, rehabilitation, and 
 
 
 42. Compare Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding that 
banishment condition is unconstitutional as either cruel and unusual punishment or denial of due 
process), with Lori Sue Collins, Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders—My Life Before and After 
HB 1059, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501 (2007) (discussing one sex offender‘s compelling story 
about the difficulty of dealing with housing, employment, and social connections given residency 
restrictions applied to her after her release from prison). 
 43. American Law Encyclopedia, supra note 1. 
 44. 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930).  
 45. Brent T. Lynch, Exile Within the United States, 11 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 22, 25 (1965). 
 46. See Ex parte Scarborough, 173 P.2d 825, 826–27 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946); see also People 
v. Blakeman, 339 P.2d 202, 202–03 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (finding ―[i]t was beyond the power of 
the court to impose banishment as a condition of probation‖ and that public policy does not permit 
―one political division to dump undesirable persons upon another‖). 
 47. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 30 (2006) (―That immigration shall be encouraged; 
emigration shall not be prohibited, and no citizen shall be exiled.‖); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 21 (―[N]or 
shall any person, under any circumstances, be exiled from the State.‖); GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 
XXI (―Neither banishment beyond the limits of the state nor whipping shall be allowed as a 
punishment for crime.‖); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11 (―No person shall be transported out of the State for 
an offense committed within the State.‖); MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XII (―And no subject shall be 
arrested, imprisoned . . . exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his 
peers, or the law of the land.‖); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.18 (Vernon 1965) (―No citizen 
shall be outlawed, nor shall any person be transported out of the State for any offense committed 
within the same.‖). 
 48. Yung, supra note 41, at 106; see also id. at 106–12. As an example, Yung notes the Soviet 
Union‘s ―Propiska‖ policy which restricted the movement and domicile of ―undesirable[]‖ citizens 
beyond the now-notorious 101st kilometer. Id. at 102. However, while modern prisons serve the same 
purpose, banishment itself has been disfavored in post-colonial America. Id. at 112–13. 
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isolation.
49
 Some Native American tribes have modernly used banishment 
as punishment,
50 
and some states have allowed judges to condition release 
of a prisoner on the prisoner‘s voluntary agreement to be exiled to another 
state or community in order to avoid punishment through continued 
confinement. For example, the Utah Supreme Court in Mansell v. Turner
 
held that so long as the prisoner is given a choice between banishment and 
continued incarceration, such a condition should be upheld.
51
 A federal 
court in Rutherford v. Blankenship also distinguished between banishment 
as a voluntary condition that is part of a plea bargain agreement and a 
mandatory court sentence that banishes the defendant.
52
 Nevertheless, the 
Blankenship court held that the banishment condition, which required the 
defendant to leave Virginia after his twelve-month sentence for felony 
maiming, was unenforceable and he was committed to the original ten-
year sentence, which had been suspended in exchange for his agreement to 
leave the state.
53
 
While some states have allowed banishment to be used as a 
probationary condition in lieu of punishment through incarceration, other 
state courts have tended to use banishment for rehabilitation purposes and 
as a way to isolate the defendant from potential victims. The Mississippi 
Supreme Court in Cobb v. State upheld a probation condition requiring the 
defendant ―to stay out of Stone County.‖54 The defendant, Cobb, pled 
guilty to aggravated assault for shooting his nephew (his brother‘s son), 
but his twelve-year sentence was suspended and replaced by a five-year 
probationary term with the banishment condition because Cobb had 
displayed an uncontrollable temper and Cobb‘s residence in Stone County 
 
 
 49. Banishment for political purposes is not addressed in this Article. For a discussion of such, 
see Juan O. Tamayo, Banishment Wears Down Cuban Dissidents, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 5, 1996, at 
12A (discussing Cuban ―tactics to control dissent‖ by ―banishing critics to the provinces, pushing them 
into exile abroad or restricting their movements in and out of Havana‖). 
 50. Marissa Stone, Dancing With Fire: Santa Clara Tribal Member Banished from Taos Pueblo 
for Writing About Tribe’s Sacred Deer Dance, THE NEW MEXICAN, Feb 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.williams.edu/go/native/naranjo.htm (discussing the story of a Santa Clara tribal member, 
married to a woman from Taos Pueblo, who was required to leave pueblo tribal land because he 
―caused irreparable harm to the sensible nature of the religious activity through exploitation‖ by 
writing an essay about Taos Pueblo‘s deer dance, which was published in a local paper); see also 
Dennis W. Lund, Modern Applications of Traditional Sanctions, 40 INT‘L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & 
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 347, 349–50 (describing a situation where two Alaskan Tlingit Indian 
seventeen-year-olds were referred by a Washington state court to a tribal panel in 1994 to both punish 
and rehabilitate them for an aggravated assault which the youths committed). 
 51. Mansell v. Turner, 384 P.2d 394, 395 (Utah 1963); see also Lynch, supra note 45, at 22, 26. 
 52. Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979). 
 53. Id. at 1361. 
 54. Cobb v. State, 437 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Miss. 1983). 
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was less than half a mile from his brother‘s house.55 The court found ―that 
the conditions imposed by the sentencing judge were reasonably related to 
Cobb‘s circumstances and his intended rehabilitation.‖56 Subsequent 
banishment cases in Mississippi in 1991 and 2000 followed the Cobb 
decision and required that probationary terms with a banishment condition 
serve some rehabilitative purpose and bear a reasonable relationship to the 
offense committed.
57
  
Rehabilitation purposes were served in an Illinois banishment case 
restricting a prostitution defendant from entering a fifty-block area of 
downtown Champaign as part of her probationary conditions.
58
 Georgia 
courts have also agreed that banishment from certain areas of the state is a 
valid condition of probation, if reasonable and supported by rehabilitative 
purposes.
59
 In State v. Collett, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld a trial 
court banishment of a drug offender, who was required to remain outside 
seven Georgia counties as a condition for suspending his sentence.
60
 The 
banishment condition imposed within the state was not unreasonable and 
was related to the rehabilitative purpose of the drug crime sentence, even 
though ―[t]he 1945 Georgia Constitution . . . expressly forbids banishment 
 
 
 55. Id. at 1219–20. 
 56. Id. at 1220–21. 
 57. See McCreary v. State, 582 So. 2d 425, 428 (Miss. 1991) (reversing sentence requiring the 
banishment of a rape defendant from the state because ―banishment from a large geographical area, 
especially outside of the State, struggles to serve any rehabilitative purpose, and implicates serious 
public policy questions against the dumping of convicts on another jurisdiction‖). A Mississippi court 
has required that a probation condition mandating that the defendant 
never return to the First Circuit Court District . . . must bear a reasonable relationship to the 
purpose of probation, the ends of justice and the best interests of the defendant and the public 
must be served, the public policy must not be violated, the rehabilitative purpose of the 
probation must not be defeated, and the defendant‘s rights under the First, Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution must not be violated. 
Hamm v. State, 1999-CP-00586-COA (¶ 12), 758 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).  
 58. People v. Pickens, 542 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (noting that geographic travel 
restrictions have been upheld by state courts to achieve rehabilitation and deterrence and that the 
restriction ―would maximize defendant‘s chance of staying away from prostitution activity and . . . it 
was a reasonable and necessary condition to assist defendant in avoiding future criminal conduct‖). 
But see People v. Harris, 606 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding a probation condition 
banishing a robbery defendant from the state is unreasonable, overbroad, and serves no valid purpose). 
 59. See, e.g., Sanchez v. State, 508 S.E.2d 185, 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that banishing 
an illegal alien from the state bore no ―logical relationship to the rehabilitative purposes of a sentence 
for battery‖); Wilson v. State, 260 S.E.2d 527, 531 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979) (upholding banishment of 
defendant convicted for terroristic threats against a woman and her family from the county as a 
condition to the court suspending his sentence against a per se attack). 
 60. State v. Collett, 208 S.E.2d 472, 474 (Ga. 1974) (presuming the regulation to be reasonable 
and finding ―no showing . . . that the imposed condition to remain outside the seven specified counties 
for the period of the sentence (12 months) is unreasonable or otherwise fails to bear a logical 
relationship to the rehabilitative scheme of the sentence pronounced for this drug crime‖). 
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beyond the limits of the state.‖61 Relying on Collett, the Georgia Supreme 
Court in its most recent banishment case, Terry v. Hamrick, upheld the 
banishment of a criminal defendant from 158 of Georgia‘s 159 counties 
because it did not banish him from the limits of the state.
62
 
Most of the modern banishment cases require the state to show a 
logical relationship to a rehabilitative purpose before upholding 
geographically restrictive probationary conditions that are not 
unreasonable and do not violate public policy.
63
 If the restricted area is 
reasonable in size and does not ban the defendant from the state entirely, 
such banishments have generally been upheld.
64
 However, as the purpose 
of the banishment moves from rehabilitation to isolation, constitutional 
concerns related to the punitive nature of such isolation may arise.
65
 
Although isolation may be considered therapeutic or rehabilitative in some 
circumstances, in extreme cases it may constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.
66
 
Isolating defendants from the temptation to reoffend, as described 
above in the prostitution and drug offender cases, may logically relate to 
the defendant‘s rehabilitation. However, isolation may also be used either 
to protect the defendant from others or to protect the defendant‘s victim 
from the defendant. In People v. Beach,
 
the court used a residency 
restriction to protect an elderly widow, who shot and killed a man she 
allegedly believed to be an intruder, from either reoffending or from the 
potential backlash of the community.
67
 As a condition of her probation for 
an involuntary manslaughter conviction, the trial judge ordered the woman 
 
 
 61. Id. at 472–73 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 2-107, art. I, § 1, para. 7 (1945)). 
 62. Terry v. Hamrick, 663 S.E.2d 256, 258–59 (Ga. 2008) (upholding the banishment condition 
because it was not unreasonable and it was logically related to rehabilitation); see also Hallford v. 
State, 657 S.E.2d 10, 13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding condition of banishment because it protected 
victim and served ―a rehabilitative purpose by removing a temptation by [defendant] to re-offend‖). 
 63. See supra notes 54–56, 57–60, and 62. 
 64. See supra notes 54–56, 57–60, and 62. 
 65. As addressed in Part I.C, residency restrictions are geared more toward isolation than 
rehabilitative purposes. Part II addresses the major constitutional concerns about these restrictions, 
while Part III addresses Dormant Commerce Clause concerns about such. 
 66. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1261 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that 
solitary confinement for some inmates may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment); see generally Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A 
Psychological Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
477 (1997). 
 67. People v. Beach, 147 Cal. App. 3d 612, 618–19 (Ct. App. 1983). The underlying altercation 
began when the widow smeared fecal matter on the alleged intruder‘s windshield after he parked in her 
driveway, refused to move it, and then left the area. Id. at 619. When the alleged intruder returned, 
there was a verbal altercation and the widow, claiming she feared for her safety, shot him in defense. 
Id.  
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to relocate from her long-time home, both to prevent future acts of 
violence by her and to protect her personal safety from others in the 
community who might wish revenge.
68
 The appellate court found this 
condition unreasonable and unconstitutional because the psychological 
stress caused by removing an elderly person from her home was ―not 
necessarily rehabilitative‖ and the ―value to the public does not manifestly 
outweigh any impairment of appellant‘s constitutional rights.‖69 
Banishment used to isolate a defendant, whether to protect the 
defendant, as with the widow in the Beach case above, or to protect others 
from the defendant, is problematic and may be unconstitutional. In State v. 
Stewart, the trial court imposed a geographic restriction on the defendant 
as a condition of his probation in order to protect the victims of his crimes 
against future offenses of public nudity, masturbation, and the abuse of his 
wife and children.
70
 Nevertheless, the appellate court found that this 
banishment from the entire township was too broad and that the term of 
his probation, which required that he have no contact with his victims or 
their families, was sufficient under the circumstances to protect the 
community.
71
 
A similar effort to banish a sex offender from the county in which he 
resided was held to be unenforceable by the Montana Supreme Court in 
State v. Muhammad.
72
 The court found that the banishment probation 
condition imposed by the trial court, presumably to protect the fourteen-
year-old victim, ―is not reasonably related to the goals of rehabilitation 
and is broader than necessary to protect the victim.‖73 However, five years 
later in 2007, the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Meyers
 
upheld a 
residency restriction preventing a domestic violence
 
defendant from 
residing in a particular county unless he was also employed in that 
county.
74 
In light of the heightened concerns about sex offenders, it seems 
 
 
 68. Id. at 620. 
 69. Id. at 622–23. The court further noted that ―there were in fact other means that the court did 
utilize that were less subversive to appellant‘s constitutional rights and still comported with the 
purposes intended by the grant of probation.‖ Id. at 623. 
 70. State v. Stewart, 2006 WI App 67, ¶ 15, 291 Wis. 2d 480 713, N.W.2d 165, 170 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting the trial court‘s finding that the defendant ―‗seemed to take a perverse delight in 
going after these particular neighbors‘‖ and thus banishment from the neighborhood served to protect 
the community). 
 71. Id. ¶¶ 15–22 (holding that banishing the defendant from the township served the purposes of 
probation and extended supervision, but it was ―unduly restrictive of his liberties‖ because it was too 
broad under the circumstances). 
 72. State v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47, ¶ 27, 304 Mont. 1, 9, 43 P.3d 318, 324 (Mont. 2002). 
 73. Id. 
 74. State v. Meyers, 2007 MT 230, ¶ 12, 339 Mont. 160, 164, 168 P.3d 645, 649–50 (Mont. 
2007). Defendant was charged with assault on a minor for hitting his eight-year-old child with a sandal 
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counterintuitive that the same court would enforce the residency restriction 
against the domestic violence defendant in Meyers, but not against the sex 
offender defendant in Muhammad. 
C. Banishment Through Sex Offender Residency Restrictions 
Sex offender residency restrictions
75
 are intended to isolate defendants 
from potential victims and do not generally serve any rehabilitative 
purpose. While courts have been hesitant to allow defendants to be 
banished from local cities, counties, or states using probation conditions 
unrelated to rehabilitative purposes, residency restrictions have been the 
latest public policy approach to legislatively manage the problem of sex 
offenders living in the community.
76
 These state statutes mandate buffer 
zones to keep sex offenders from living too close to schools, parks, day 
 
 
between twelve and fifteen times. Id. ¶¶ 1–4. The court distinguished the ―banishment‖ condition in 
Muhammad from the ―residency restriction‖ condition in Meyers because the residency restriction in 
Meyers was sufficiently tailored to ―satisf[y] the requirement [that it] be reasonably related to the 
protection of the victims and society.‖ Id. ¶¶ 17–22. 
 75. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(f) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007) (setting forth a typical multi-
layered exclusion zone policy applying to sex offenders who have committed crimes against children, 
supplemented with an additional loitering restriction); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128(a) (2006) (setting 
forth narrow exclusion zone policy, involving an individualized determination of the dangerousness of 
the offender); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.065 (West 2007) (providing exclusion scheme that applies only 
to those sex offenders whose crimes involved a minor); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (Supp. 2007) 
(establishing one of the harshest exclusion zones, with a 1000-foot radius that applies to churches, 
swimming pools, parks, playgrounds, bus stops, gymnasiums, and other areas where ―minors 
congregate‖); IOWA CODE ANN. § 692A.2A (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (applying restriction only to 
sex offenders that committed crimes against minors, but providing a broad exclusion zone radius of 
two thousand feet around designated areas); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91.1(A)(2)–14:91.2 (2004 & 
Supp. 2009) (applies only to ―sexually violent predator[s]‖ but creates exclusion zones around 
playgrounds, pools, youth centers, and arcades, in addition to the usual suspects). For a more 
comprehensive analysis of these statutes, see Yung, supra note 41, at 117–25. 
 76. See Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: 
1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step from Absurd?, 49 INT. J. OFFENDER THER. & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 168, 168 (2005) (noting that these residence restrictions are the ―newest wave‖ of 
legislation designed to control recidivism in addition to ―policies mandating sex offender registration, 
community notification, civil commitment, castration, ‗three-strikes and you‘re out,‘ and 
nondiscretionary sentencing‖); see also Durling, supra note 5, at 322 (observing that ―[t]hirteen states, 
including Illinois, have passed laws in the last five years banning sex offenders from living within a 
certain distance of schools, parks, day care centers, and ‗places where children normally 
congregate‘‖); Katie Zezima, After Rape, Calls to Limit Where Sex Offenders Go, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 2008, at A9 (―Many states and municipalities have tried to enact restrictions on where sex 
offenders can live, including keeping them a certain distance away from parks, playgrounds and even 
bus stops, with mixed results.‖); Patty Salkin, Law of the Land, Residency Restrictions for Convicted 
Sex Offenders Continuing Subject of Attention in New York (Dec. 23, 2008), http://lawoftheland. 
wordpress.com/2008/12/23/residency-restrictions-for-convicted-sex-offenders-continuing-subject-of-
attention-in-new-york/. 
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care centers, school bus stops, or other places where children may gather.
77
 
Such legislation may effectively banish sex offenders from a community, 
as the residency restrictions may have the cumulative effect of creating a 
black-out zone for virtually an entire town or city.
78
 When such 
restrictions become a de facto banishment, they may be considered a form 
of punishment and implicate constitutional concerns.
79
 
Concerns have been expressed about the effectiveness of residency 
restrictions given that such restrictions will likely reduce housing options 
for sex offenders.
80
 When housing options are reduced, the resulting 
homelessness and transience will make monitoring and treatment of these 
individuals more difficult.
81 
Offenders may be forced into rural areas 
without access to employment or into offender clusters in economically 
distressed urban neighborhoods.
82
 The psychological stress from 
―isolation, disempowerment, shame, depression, anxiety, [and] lack of 
social supports . . . can trigger‖ deviant behavior and exacerbate, not 
decrease, sex offender recidivism.
83
 
One exploratory study conducted in 2004 surveyed 135 sex offenders 
in Florida who were subject to residency restrictions.
84
 The major themes 
that emerged from this study confirmed that offenders believed their risk 
of reoffending increased when they were isolated from family and friends 
as a result of these geographical restrictions and that the 1,000-foot rule in 
 
 
 77. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76, at 168. 
 78. See id. at 169 (noting that the ―dispersal of parks and schools may lead to overlapping 
restriction zones thus making it essentially impossible for sex offenders in some cities to find suitable 
housing‖); see also Lund, supra note 50, at 351 (noting that although ―[b]anishment, in the form of 
forced change of geographic community location for offenders, cannot usually be officially employed 
in our democratic society. . . . [R]emoval of an offender from his or her own home base of operations 
for a short-term placement in a half-way-in house . . . is a mild form of banishment . . . .‖); Duster, 
supra note 38, at 714–15; but see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting the 
analogy between banishment and Iowa‘s residency restriction statute for sex offenders). 
 79. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 101–06 (2003). For an insightful discussion on the difference 
between cases imposing banishment in the probation context and exclusion laws, see Wayne A. Logan, 
The Importance of Purpose in Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 214–27 (2003) 
(distinguishing probation conditions as temporary while residency restrictions are permanent and apply 
to a wide swath of offenders, so the probationary purpose nexus is not met). For an overview on the 
decisions made by and discretion given to a parole board before a sex offender is released, see Wayne 
A. Logan, A Study in “Actuarial Justice”: Sex Offender Classification Practice and Procedure, 3 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2000). 
 80. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76, at 169; see also Michael Rothfeld, A 2nd Look at 
Jessica’s Law, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2008, at B1. 
 81. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76, at 169. 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 170–71. 
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force in Florida likely had no effect on their risk of reoffending.
85 
Factors 
such as whether an offender is committed to treatment and recovery are 
more important than geography.
86
 Indeed, offenders tend to engage in 
criminal behavior outside of their own neighborhoods for fear of 
recognition.
87
 The study concluded that sex offenders ―will circumvent 
restrictions if they are determined to reoffend.‖88 The benefits of residency 
restrictions in reducing recidivism have not been proven and authors of 
another recent study by the Minnesota Department of Corrections in 2007 
concluded ―that the potential deterrent effects of a residence restriction law 
would likely be ‗marginal‘ at best.‖89 Therefore, it is important to consider 
the potential for adverse, unintended consequences of this ―banishment‖ 
policy approach when the benefits of such a policy are uncertain at best. 
It appears necessary to take ―[a] more individualized approach to sex 
offender management [that] can enhance public safety while promoting 
successful reintegration for offenders.‖90 Banishment of sex offenders 
through judicial probationary conditions or legislative residency 
restrictions does not necessarily achieve the goal of protecting innocent 
victims from potential reoffending.
91
 Moreover, as discussed below, these 
residency restrictions may be challenged as unconstitutional infringements 
on civil liberties, which are not justified if the purpose for enacting them is 
not being achieved and may, in fact, exacerbate the problem in certain 
situations.
92
 
II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS CHALLENGES TO RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS  
Residency restrictions have generally been upheld, with a few 
exceptions,
93
 in state and federal courts as valid constitutional constraints 
 
 
 85. Id. at 174. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.; see also Tewksbury, supra note 15, at 536 (noting that ―a 2004 study by the Colorado 
Department of Public Safety showed that, if and when registered sex offenders recidivated, they were 
highly unlikely to commit a sex offense near their places of residence‖). 
 88. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76, at 176. 
 89. Levenson et al., supra note 5, at 3. 
 90. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76, at 176. 
 91. See Durling, supra note 5, at 335 (noting that ―residency restrictions suffer from several 
practical problems that call into question their basis, efficacy, and fairness‖). 
 92. Adding additional insight, Yung analyzes some of the pros and cons of residency restrictions. 
See Yung, supra note 41, at 139–58. On one hand, exclusionary zones facilitate law enforcement and 
allow convicted sex offenders (who deserve to be punished) to avoid temptation. Id. at 154–58. On the 
other hand, exclusion zones reinforce the otherness of offenders by rendering them exiles and use a 
form of class-based banishment that is antithetical to American democracy. Id. at 139–47. 
 93. See, e.g., Mikaloff v. Walsh, No. 5:06-CV-96, 2007 WL 2572268, at *4–12 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 
4, 2007) (residency restriction found to be punitive and unconstitutional as an ex post facto law); Mann 
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on sex offender liberties.
94
 For example, in State v. Seering,
 
the Iowa 
Supreme Court upheld an Iowa statute, enacted in 2002, which prohibited 
sex offenders from living within two thousand feet of an elementary or 
secondary school or child care center.
95
 Just a few months earlier, the 
Eighth Circuit upheld this same Iowa statute against constitutional 
challenges in Doe v. Miller.
96
 In the Iowa state case, the Seering court 
reviewed procedural due process, substantive due process, ex post facto, 
Fifth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment challenges to the residency 
restrictions.
97
 The Eighth Circuit in Miller similarly addressed the Iowa 
residency restrictions and upheld them against an ex post facto claim and 
other constitutional challenges.
98
 Residency restrictions for sex offenders 
are the political response that followed the earlier implementation of 
registration laws, and reported cases of constitutional challenges to this 
recent legislation are limited.
99
 The litigation challenges to the Iowa 
residency statute provide an illustration of how courts may approach this 
issue and demonstrate that these statutes will likely be upheld. 
 
 
v. Ga. Dept. of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 745–56 (Ga. 2007) (finding that residency restriction ―is 
unconstitutional to the extent that it permits the regulatory taking of appellant‘s property without just 
and adequate compensation‖); State v. Pollard, 886 N.E.2d 69, 75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding 
that residency restriction statute is an ex post facto law because it is punitive and is applied 
retroactively to sex offenders); R.L. v. Mo. Dept. of Corr., 245 S.W.3d 236, 237–38 (Mo. 2008) 
(residency restriction violates Missouri‘s constitutional bar against retrospective civil laws because it 
imposes new obligations on defendants based on offenses committed before the statute was enacted). 
 94. See, e.g., McAteer v. Riley, No. 2:07-CV-G92-WKW, 2008 WL 898932, at *5 (M.D. Ala. 
Mar. 31, 2008) (plaintiff did not show substantial likelihood of success on the merits to support his 
motion for a preliminary injunction against the Alabama residency and employment restrictions for sex 
offenders on the basis that they are ex post facto laws); People v. Morgan, 881 N.E.2d 507, 512 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2007) (concluding that residency restrictions are constitutional and do not constitute an ex 
post facto law); Wright v. Iowa Dept. of Corr., 747 N.W.2d 213, 216–18 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting 
defendant‘s assertion that residency restrictions were unconstitutional as violating his equal protection 
and substantive due process rights and as an invalid bill of attainder). 
 95. State v. Seering, 701 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 2005) (upholding IOWA CODE § 692A.2A 
(2003)). 
 96. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704–05 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 97. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 662–70. 
 98. Miller, 405 F.3d at 705.  
 99. See, e.g., Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept., 453 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 127 S. Ct. 2128 (2007) (finding the Arkansas residency restriction ―on even stronger 
constitutional footing than the Iowa statute‖ upheld in Miller); Hodges v. Norris, No. 5:07-CV-00062, 
2008 WL 80547, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 3, 2008) (dismissing ex post facto claim against residency 
restriction on the basis that it was enacted for a nonpunitive purpose in order to protect public safety 
and was, therefore, not unconstitutional); People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 776–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005) (upholding sex offender residency restriction law against substantive due process challenge); 
State v. Groves, 742 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Iowa 2007) (concluding that residency restriction did not violate 
substantive due process rights).  
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A. Due Process Challenges  
In Seering, the defendant argued that the Iowa residency restriction 
interfered with his substantive due process right to freedom of choice as to 
where he could live and under what conditions.
100
 The court found that the 
defendant‘s asserted interest was not a fundamental interest and required 
only a rational basis review.
101
 The court found there to be a reasonable fit 
between the government interest in addressing the risk of sex offender 
recidivism and the residency restrictions used to advance the government‘s 
interest in reducing this risk.
102 
The procedural due process challenge was 
similarly reviewed under a rational basis standard.
103
 The court determined 
that the defendant had adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, as well 
as the opportunity to challenge the validly enacted statute in court.
104 
Thus, 
while the defendant was entitled to minimal procedural protections, the 
defendant‘s due process rights were not violated.105  
The Miller court determined that the statute did not violate procedural 
due process because it provided adequate notice as to the prohibited 
conduct of residing in restricted areas and it did not violate defendant‘s 
opportunity to be heard.
106
 The statute was valid even though it failed to 
provide a process for determining the level of dangerousness for each 
individual.
107
 The substantive due process challenge also failed because 
the court concluded residency restrictions did not infringe a fundamental 
right such as the right to privacy and family, or the right to travel or live 
where you wish, so the court did not apply strict scrutiny.
108 
Thus, when 
examined under rational basis review, Iowa‘s decision to enact the statute 
was a rational approach to protect the health and safety of its citizens 
against unpredictable behavior by sex offenders, and the residency 
restriction rationally advanced this state interest.
109
 
 
 
 100. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 665. 
 101. See id.  
 102. See id. 
 103. Id. at 665–66.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d at 700, 708–09 (8th Cir. 2005).  
 107. Id. at 709 (concluding that subjecting all offenders to the restrictions without allowing for 
exemptions did not violate procedural due process). 
 108. Id. at 709. 
 109. Id. at 714–16 (noting that twelve other states have enacted similar residency restrictions and 
that it is ―‗common sense‘ that limiting the frequency of contact between sex offenders and areas 
where children are located is likely to reduce the risk of an offense‖). 
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B. Self-Incrimination and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Challenges  
The Seering defendant‘s claims under the Fifth Amendment that the 
residency restrictions compelled him to be a witness against himself were 
rejected by the court, which concluded that ―there is nothing about the 
restriction that compels sex offenders to be witnesses against 
themselves.‖110 The defendant‘s claim that the residency restrictions are 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment was also 
rejected because the restriction was enacted to address the concerns about 
sex offender recidivism, not to punish the defendant, and the potential 
two-year punishment for violating the restriction was not considered 
disproportionate to the underlying crime.
111 
In Miller, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
was not violated by the state because ―the residency restriction does not 
compel a sex offender to be a witness against himself or a witness of any 
kind‖ since it only prohibits the offender from residing in certain areas and 
―does not require him to provide any information that might be used 
against him in a criminal case.‖112 
C. Ex Post Facto Challenges  
The ex post facto clause in both federal and state constitutions prohibits 
imposing new or more burdensome punishment in criminal cases after a 
crime has been committed, and sex offenders have utilized this clause to 
challenge residency restrictions as punishment by means of banishment.
113 
In Smith v. Doe, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Alaska‘s regulations 
requiring convicted sex offenders to register with the state as a reasonable 
and nonpunitive approach to address the concern of sex offender 
recidivism.
114 Relying on the Court‘s decision in Smith, the Seering court 
noted that while residency restrictions may impact the traditional 
punishment goals of deterrence and retribution, ―many governmental 
programs exist that may ‗deter crime without imposing punishment.‘‖115 
The Seering court recognized that residency restrictions have ―some 
punitive impact,‖ but the statute was rationally related to the nonpunitive 
 
 
 110. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 669. 
 111. Id. at 670. 
 112. Miller, 405 F.3d at 716. 
 113. Seering, 701 N.W.2d, at 666–67 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, and IOWA CONST. art. I, 
§ 21, and noting that civil penalties are not subject to this restriction). 
 114. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105 (2003). 
 115. Seering, 701 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 102). 
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purpose of protecting society against the risk of sex offender recidivism.
116
 
Thus, the court upheld the restrictions against the ex post facto challenge 
because it concluded that the statute did not impose criminal punishment, 
and, even if it did, the statute did not punish ―action that has occurred prior 
to the statute‘s enactment or increase[] . . . the punishment for a crime 
after its commission.‖117  
The Miller court‘s analysis of the ex post facto clause was the most 
controversial portion of the federal decision analyzing the Iowa statute, 
and caused one of the panel‘s members to dissent as to the holding that the 
residency restriction did not amount to punishment.
118
 The majority 
concluded that the purpose of the statute was intended to protect the health 
and safety of the citizens, not punish the defendant for a prior sex 
offense,
119
 and the dissent agreed with this determination.
120 
The court also 
considered five factors identified by the Supreme Court in Smith to 
determine whether ―the law was nonetheless so punitive in effect as to 
negate the legislature‘s intent to create a civil, non-punitive regulatory 
scheme.‖121 
In analyzing the five factors, the majority and dissent reached quite 
different conclusions. The first factor from Smith required the court to 
determine ―whether the law has been regarded in our history and traditions 
as punishment.‖122 The majority concluded that the residency restrictions 
were not equivalent to banishment as a traditional means of punishment.
123
 
The dissent disagreed and noted that while the residency restrictions might 
not constitute a complete banishment, the statute nevertheless ―sufficiently 
resembles banishment to make this factor weigh towards finding the law 
punitive.‖124 The dissent also disagreed with the majority‘s determination 
that the residency restriction did not serve a traditional aim of punishment. 
Instead, the dissent found that the deterrent effect of such restrictions in 
 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 668; see also id. at 668–69 (concluding that punishment under the residency restrictions 
only results when the statute has been violated, not simply because the defendant is a convicted 
offender, and ―it is the violation of the residency restriction statute itself that makes him subject to a 
new punishment‖). 
 118. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 723 (8th Cir. 2005) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the 
majority that the purpose of the statute was nonpunitive but disagreeing with majority‘s analysis and 
decision as to whether the statute was so punitive in effect as to offset the nonpunitive purpose). 
 119. Id. at 718–19. 
 120. Id. at 723 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 719 (majority opinion). 
 122. Id. at 719–20. 
 123. Id. (concluding that the ―law is unlike banishment in important respects‖). 
 124. Id. at 724 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
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keeping the offender from committing future crimes made it punitive.
125
 
The third factor, ―whether it imposes an affirmative disability or 
restraint,‖126 was found by both the majority and the dissent to be present 
in the residency restriction, although the majority noted that it was much 
less disabling than civil commitment.
127 
The dissent also agreed with the 
majority‘s finding that the residency restriction was rationally related ―to 
the nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public.‖128 When examining the 
fifth factor, whether the residency restriction is excessive with regard to its 
purpose of protecting the public, the majority found the restriction was 
reasonably related to its regulatory purpose and that the plaintiffs failed to 
establish it was excessive in relation to its legitimate statutory purpose.
129
 
In contrast, the dissent found that many of the offenders could not live 
with their families or communities, would be subject throughout their lives 
to the restriction because there is no time limit, and that the statute applies 
to all sex offenders without regard to the seriousness of their risk to the 
community.
130 
While the majority found the statute nonpunitive and 
therefore constitutional, the dissent would have weighed the five factors in 
favor of finding the residency restriction to be punitive and, therefore, an 
unconstitutional ex post facto law.
131
 
The five-factor analysis developed in Smith and applied to residency 
restrictions in both Seeley and Miller has been used by some state courts to 
uphold these restrictions as nonpunitive.
132
 Other courts have resolved ex 
post facto challenges by using grandfather provisions and refusing to 
apply these statutes retroactively against sex offenders whose crimes were 
committed prior to the enactment of these restrictions.
133 
However, in 
 
 
 125. Id. at 725 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 719 (majority opinion). 
 127. Compare id. at 719–21 (majority opinion), with id. at 725 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 725 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 723.  
 130. Id. at 725–26 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 131. Compare id. at 723 n.6 (majority opinion) (noting that even if the residency restriction statute 
were punitive, it would not violate the Eighth Amendment because it is ―neither barbaric nor grossly 
disproportionate to the offenses committed‖), with id. at 726 (Melloy, J., dissenting). 
 132. See, e.g., People v. Morgan, 881 N.E.2d 507, 508–10 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (noting that the 
legislature did not intend for the statute to be punitive and concluding that, based on the five-factor 
analysis adopted by an earlier Illinois decision in People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 779 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005), the Illinois residency restriction did not constitute an unconstitutional ex post facto law). 
 133. See, e.g., Doe v. Schwarzenegger, No. 06-06968, 2007 WL 601977, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 
2007); Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181 (E.D. Cal. 2007); see also People v. 
Presley, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 826, 830 (Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the issue of retroactivity of residency 
restrictions was not before the court but citing the federal cases of Doe v. Schwarzenegger); State v. 
Finders, 743 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 2008) (main consideration of Iowa legislature in enacting the 
grandfather provision ―was to avoid the harsh effect of the retroactive application of the two thousand 
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some cases where the court has found no exception or grandfather 
provision to prevent application of residency restrictions against sex 
offenders who were convicted before the statute‘s enactment, such 
legislation has been considered an unconstitutional ex post facto law.
134
  
For example, in Mikaloff,
 
a federal district court in Ohio applied the 
five Smith factors to find an Ohio residency restriction to be in violation of 
the Constitution‘s ex post facto clause.135 First, the Mikaloff court found 
that the Ohio legislature intended the residency restriction to be punitive 
and that even if this intent was not express, its punitive purpose was 
implied as evidenced by the restriction‘s inclusion in Ohio‘s criminal 
code.
136
 However, the court also used the Smith factors to consider the 
statute‘s effect and determined that the restriction ―imposes an onerous 
affirmative disability and restraint.‖137 The court found that preventing a 
sex offender from living in his home, even if he purchased it before the 
residency restriction took effect, was a ―substantial housing disadvantage‖ 
and affected a person‘s freedom to live on his own property.138 This 
housing disadvantage consequently restrains the sex offender from having 
access to other important opportunities such as employment, schooling for 
children, drug treatment programs, and medical care.
139
 The court found 
that the restrictions were analogous to probation and parole, but were more 
restrictive in that they applied for life and significantly deprived the 
offender of liberty and property interests and ―sentence[d] them to a life of 
transience.‖140  
 
 
foot rule‖). Such was also at issue in a trio of Ohio cases: Hyle v. Porter, 117 Ohio St. 3d 165, 2008-
Ohio-542, 882 N.E.2d 899, at ¶ 24 (Ohio 2008) (concluding that the residency restriction statute was 
not expressly made retroactive and ―does not apply to an offender who bought his home and 
committed his offense before the effective date of the statute‖); State v. Ware, No. 90051, 2008 WL 
2350626, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 2008) (refusing to apply the residency restriction to defendants 
who bought their home and committed their sexually oriented offense before the restriction was 
enacted); Vandervoot v. Larson, No. 07CA46, 2008 WL 2573296, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. June 9, 2008) 
(noting that Hyle ―is expressly limited to situations in which the offender not only committed his 
offense before the effective date of the statute, but also purchased his home before the effective date of 
the statute‖). 
 134. See, e.g., Mikaloff v. Walsh, No. 5:06-CV-96, 2007 WL 2572268 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2007). 
 135. Id. at *8. 
 136. Id. at *5. The Mikaloff court also noted that ―[t]wo Ohio Courts have considered similar 
challenges and have found the legislature intended the residency restriction to be civil.‖ Id. at *7 
(citing Doe v. Petro, No. 1:05-CV-125, 2005 WL 1038846 (S.D. Ohio May 3, 2005); State ex rel. 
White v. Billings, 139 Ohio Misc. 2d 76 (Ohio Ct. C. P. Clermont County 2006)). 
 137. Id. at *8. 
 138. Id. at *9. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at *10. 
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Finding that the Ohio statute significantly furthered retribution and 
promoted general deterrence, the court concluded that the restriction was 
vengeful in nature because it failed to differentiate between offenders and 
their risk of reoffense.
141 
Although the court concluded that there was 
some rational connection between the residency restriction and protecting 
children, it pointed out the absurdity of the regulation: the regulation 
allowed the sex offender to stay in the restricted residence during the day 
when children were attending the nearby school, but required the offender 
―to sleep in his truck at night, when, presumably, the children are safely at 
home.‖142 The court also noted that the restrictions do ―not address the 
majority of child sex abuse cases because those cases involve family 
members or acquaintances‖ and such an offender is not automatically 
restricted from living with their previous victims.
143
 Finally, the Mikaloff 
court determined that even though the statute was rational, it was 
excessive in regards to its purpose because it was not based upon an 
individualized risk assessment.
144 
After this very compelling analysis, the 
court held that the sex offender‘s ―inability to continue to reside in his 
home would cause him severe injury‖ and that the statute ―violates the ex 
post facto clause of the Constitution.‖145 
D. Takings Challenges 
Sex offender residency restrictions have been challenged as a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment, which provides in part, ―nor shall private 
property be taken for a public purpose without just compensation.‖146 
When government regulation ―goes too far‖147 such that it deprives the 
landowner of economically viable use, the government will be required to 
pay just compensation as though it had used its eminent domain power to 
take the landowner‘s property.148 Residency restriction statutes that 
deprive a sex offender of a property interest without the payment of just 
compensation may be considered a taking if, under the factors identified 
 
 
 141. Id. at *11 (noting that the residency restriction requires that ―[a] feeble, aging paraplegic 
must leave his home just as a younger one‖).  
 142. Id. The court also noted that if sex offenders lived near the school, parents would be notified 
of their presence, but if they stay in the residence next to the school, but did not sleep there, the 
registration process would not alert parents to the nearby potential danger. Id. 
 143. Id. at *12. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at *13. 
 146. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 147. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 148. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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by the Supreme Court in Penn Central, the economic impact of the 
restriction on the offender‘s ―investment-backed expectations‖ is 
particularly severe.
149
 The property interest impacted may be a real 
property interest, if the offender is forced to move from a home he or she 
owns, or a personal property interest, if the offender‘s employment, 
business, or a lease agreement is affected by a geographic restriction 
regulation.
150
  
In Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections, the Georgia Supreme 
Court applied the Penn Central factors and found an unconstitutional 
regulatory taking of a sex offender‘s property where the offender was 
forced to move from his home after a child-care facility opened within one 
thousand feet of his property.
151 
First, in determining the severity of the 
economic impact suffered by the offender, the court found that the 
residency restriction mandated the immediate physical removal of the 
offender from the home that he and his wife purchased as their primary 
residence prior to the location of the child-care facility.
152 
This immediate 
physical removal from his property was a significant economic burden on 
the offender because he was required to find a new, unrestricted residence 
and maintain both until he and his wife could dispose of the now restricted 
residence.
153
 Second, the court found the restriction ―positively precludes 
[the offender] from having any reasonable investment-backed expectation 
in any property purchased as his private residence‖ because the residency 
restriction could potentially force the offender from any location in which 
he might choose to relocate whenever a sensitive use, such as a day care 
center, a bus stop, a playground, or a church locates within the statutory 
 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. See, e.g., Mann v. Ga. Dep‘t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Ga. 2007) (finding a regulatory 
taking of a real property interest, but rejecting offender‘s claim that workplace restrictions 
unconstitutionally deprived him of a property interest in his business without just compensation); see 
also State v. Pollard, 886 N.E.2d 69, 74–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that applying a residency 
statute to property owned and resided in as a home before the offender‘s conviction would affect 
substantial property rights, thus court refused to enforce the regulation as an unconstitutional ex post 
facto law). But see People v. Marshall, No. A117256, 2008 WL 2487865, at *1, 3-4 (Cal. Ct. App. 
June 23, 2008) (holding that residency restriction was not ―unconstitutional under the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment‖ because there was not a sufficient property interest alleged since offender 
could not show that he would be contributing financially to the rent, mortgage, or other expenses in 
order to live at his friend‘s home in a restricted area). 
 151. Mann, 653 S.E.2d at 743 (analyzing claims of regulatory takings as an ad hoc factual inquiry 
as to the severity of the burden imposed by the government regulation, the degree to which it interferes 
with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action) (citing 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
 152. Id. at 743–44. 
 153. Id. at 744. 
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1,000-foot buffer zone.
154
 Finally, private third parties could force the 
offender to forfeit property rights by establishing a child-care facility or 
any other ―sensitive use‖ into the zone surrounding the offender‘s 
property.
155 
Thus, in assessing the character of the government action, the 
statute effectively empowered private third parties with the state‘s police 
power.
156
 Recognizing that the residency restrictions were enacted for the 
purpose of protecting the public, the Georgia court observed that 
―registered sex offenders alone bear the burden of the particular type of 
protection provided by the residency restriction‖ and concluded that 
―justice requires that the burden of safeguarding minors from encounters 
with registered sexual offenders must be ‗spread among taxpayers through 
the payment of compensation.‘‖157 Thus, the court found the residency 
restriction regulation to be an unconstitutional regulatory taking of the sex 
offender‘s real property without just compensation.158 
Prior to the Mann decision, a federal district court in Georgia dismissed 
a sex offender‘s claim that, because he was forced from living with his 
wife, daughter, son, and mother-in-law at the family residence after the 
residency act was enacted, the residency restriction constituted an 
unconstitutional taking.
159 
The court in Doe v. Baker applied the Penn 
Central factors and concluded the following: (1) the economic impact was 
minimal because the plaintiff was not forced to sell his home, but merely 
prohibited from living in his family residence; (2) the regulation did not 
interfere with any reasonable investment-backed expectations because he 
was not required to rent the house against his will, and he retained the 
right to make other reasonable use of the property; and (3) the character of 
the action—to protect minors—weighed against finding a regulatory 
taking.
160 
 
The Georgia Supreme Court‘s finding of a regulatory taking in Mann 
seems more reasonable than the approach expressed by the federal court in 
Baker, which allows a landowner to be ousted from his property without 
compensation by stating that he can make reasonable use of his home, 
 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 742–43. 
 156.  Id. at 745. 
 157. Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005)). 
 158. Id. The court did not find the work restrictions in the regulation to be an unconstitutional 
taking and rejected the challenge. Id. at 745–46. 
 159. See Doe v. Baker, No. Civ. A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 
2006) (dismissing plaintiff‘s ex post facto, substantive and procedural due process, and Eighth 
Amendment challenges). 
 160. Id. at *8–9 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
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even if he cannot live in it. It is difficult to understand how a newly 
enacted regulation, or having a new sensitive use move into a restricted 
buffer zone, could constitutionally require a landowner, even a registered 
sex offender, to move from his primary residence. It might also be 
possible for the government to argue, by analogy to criminal forfeiture 
proceedings, that applying a criminal law that results in a loss of property 
cannot be considered a compensable taking.
161 
However, once a residency 
restriction is considered criminal and punitive in nature, it cannot survive 
an ex post facto challenge if it is punishment enacted after an offense is 
committed. As punishment, it could only apply prospectively to sex 
offenders who commit their offense after the residency restriction is 
enacted.
162
 
In addition to arguing that residency restrictions constitute a taking 
when they require a forfeiture of real property rights, sex offenders can 
allege a taking of a personal property interest, if they can first establish a 
property interest in a lease, a business, or other type of entitlement. In 
Mann, the sex offender alleged that he was deprived of his property 
interest in his business because the residency statute also prohibited him 
from working at the restaurant, in which he owned a half interest.
163
 The 
court held that although the offender was not allowed to work at the 
restaurant he did not establish that this restriction unduly burdened his 
financial interest or reasonable investment-backed expectation in his 
business, since he was able to retain his half interest and perform some of 
his duties, such as accounting, off site.
164 
The offender did establish a 
property interest, but the takings claim for an unconstitutional interference 
with the personal property interest in his business was rejected by the 
court.
165
 
E. Private Restrictive Covenants 
Private restrictive covenants, commonly used for homeowner 
association rules, are another source of sex offender residency restrictions. 
 
 
 161. See People v. Marshall, No. A117256, 2008 WL 2487865, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 
2008) (―[I]t is questionable whether the application of a criminal law that results in a loss of property 
supports a constitutional takings claim.‖). 
 162. See, e.g., State v. Pollard, 886 N.E.2d 69, 74–75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that a 
residency statute is a criminal statute and applying it to property owned before the enactment of the 
statute would be unconstitutional). 
 163. Mann v. Ga. Dep‘t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 746 (Ga. 2007) (restaurant had a lease for 
property that was within one thousand feet of a child care facility, school, or church). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
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The New Jersey court in Mulligan v. Panther Valley Property Owners 
Association concluded that the record was insufficient to determine 
whether an amendment made to a residential community‘s Declaration of 
Covenants and Restrictions that prohibited the sale of residences to Tier 3 
sex offenders was invalid.
166
 The court reviewed the plaintiff‘s arguments 
and noted that her contention that the prohibition unlawfully infringed her 
right to alienate her property was unconvincing since there were only 
eighty Tier 3 sex offenders in a population of 8.4 million to whom plaintiff 
could not sell her home.
167
 In addition, the court considered her argument 
that the prohibition ―compels her to violate the law by obligating her to 
seek out and identify such Tier 3 registrants‖ to be ―wholly 
insubstantial.‖168 
The Panther Valley court did consider carefully plaintiff‘s third 
argument that the prohibition violates public policy.
169 
Not knowing how 
many communities in New Jersey had passed similar residency restrictions 
against Tier 3 sex offenders, the court was concerned that such restrictive 
covenants could ―make a large segment of the housing market unavailable 
to one category of individual and indeed perhaps to approach ‗the ogre of 
vigilantism and harassment.‘‖170 While the court recognized that sex 
offenders are not a protected group under New Jersey‘s Law Against 
Discrimination or under the federal Fair Housing Act, it nevertheless 
questioned whether ―large segments of the State could entirely close their 
doors to such individuals, confining them to a narrow corridor and thus 
perhaps exposing those within that remaining corridor to a greater risk of 
harm than they might otherwise have had to confront.‖171 Thus, the New 
Jersey court was concerned not only about the individual rights of sex 
offenders, but also about the potential impact on the communities to which 
these individuals would be relegated. Because of the broad social and legal 
issues presented, the court declined to attempt a solution when the record 
was insufficient to permit a proper determination.
172
 
 
 
 166. Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass‘n, 766 A.2d 1186, 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001) (reversing trial court‘s judgment upholding the amendment‘s validity). 
 167. Id. at 1192. Tier 3 sex offenders are the highest classification within Megan‘s law and are 
classified as such because they ―pose a high risk of re-offending.‖ Id. at 1189. 
 168. Id. at 1192. 
 169. Id. (noting that it ―gives us pause, at least in one regard‖). 
 170. Id. at 1192–93 (quoting Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 422 (N.J. 1995)). The court noted the 
New Jersey Supreme Court was concerned about this danger when it upheld Megan‘s Law in Poritz. 
Id. 
 171. Id. at 1193. 
 172. Id. 
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One remaining question about private covenants prohibiting sex 
offenders is whether these covenants may be challenged on constitutional 
grounds. Private covenants are generally not considered state action 
subject to constitutional restraints, unless they can be so considered under 
the principles from Shelley v. Kraemer.
173
 In Shelley, the U.S. Supreme 
Court refused to enforce a racially restrictive private covenant because to 
do so would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
174 
The Court determined that judicial enforcement of the 
private covenant constituted state action, a conclusion that made it 
possible to claim that a private restrictive covenant violated a 
constitutional right.
175
 Since it is unlikely that courts will extend the 
Shelley holding in order to subject covenants discriminating against sex 
offenders to constitutional constraints, any challenges to these private 
agreements affecting residency will need to be based on public policy 
grounds.
176 
Alternatively, residential community associations that are 
viewed as quasi-governmental because they function as a public entity 
may be subject to constitutional limitations such as those discussed above 
for legislative restrictions on sex offender residency.
177
 
There are several viable constitutional challenges to state and local 
residency restrictions that can be asserted to protect the individual liberties 
of convicted sex offenders. These challenges have received little sympathy 
from the courts and public opinion because sex offenders are a portion of 
our society many would prefer to see disappear.
178
 However, society in 
general may be at a greater risk because of these types of regulations as 
they may result in homelessness and hopelessness for sex offenders. 
Further state and local residency restrictions may result in ―dumping‖ 
these unwanted citizens into neighboring municipalities, counties, and 
even states, thereby creating a national problem. In particular, 
economically distressed and rural neighborhoods may be adversely 
 
 
 173. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
 174. Id. at 20. 
 175. Id. (noting that ―[s]tate action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms‖). 
 176. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth Anniversary: “A Time For Keeping; A 
Time For Throwing Away”?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 120 (1998) (suggesting that Shelley no longer be 
used to subject private action to constitutional limitations); John J. Herman, Comment, Not in My 
Community: Is It Legal for Private Entities to Ban Sex Offenders from Living in Their Communities?, 
16 WIDENER L.J. 165, 188 (2006) (noting that a majority of states have not concluded as Texas has 
that ―state action exists in enforcing community association restrictive covenants and that 
constitutional analysis must be undertaken‖) (quoting David Ramsey, Megan’s Law and Community 
Associations: The Case for Banning Sex-Offenders, 2 CAI‘S J. COMMUNITY ASS‘N L. 2, 6 (1999)). 
 177. See Herman, supra note 176, at 188–89. 
 178. See, e.g., Dennis & Waite, supra note 40.  
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affected by these regulations as sex offenders are pushed to the outer edges 
of the community, either geographically or economically. This effect 
raises concerns about racism and general fairness, similar to those 
expressed through the environmental justice movement. 
III. NATIONAL CHALLENGES TO BANISHMENT: PROTECTIONISM AND THE 
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
Protectionist public policies adopted by state and local governments 
may be subject to constitutional challenge on a national level as sex 
offenders are banished from their own communities into surrounding 
neighborhoods and even other states.
179 
Professor Wayne Logan, in his 
powerful article, Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence 
Exclusion Laws, articulates the potential Dormant Commerce Clause 
challenge against state and local sex offender residency restrictions and 
concludes that such a challenge, along with a potential claim sounding in 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, ―hold[s] little promise for ultimate 
success.‖180 This Article addresses only the potential Dormant Commerce 
Clause challenge to state and local protectionist restrictions, but as 
Professor Logan so ably argues in his essay about the undermining of 
American constitutional collectivism by local sex offender controls, ―the 
treatment of ex-offenders is manifestly a national concern that ultimately 
must be addressed by the constituent parts of the nation as a whole.‖181 
Analyzing a claim for a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause 
requires a determination of whether the challenged state or local regulation 
unduly burdens interstate commerce. First, the regulation must actually 
affect interstate commerce and the U.S. Supreme Court has broadly 
defined the scope of commerce to include trash,
182 
water,
183
 birds,
184
 and 
even the transportation of people.
185 
In Edwards v. California, the Court 
held that states are prohibited from isolating themselves ―from difficulties 
common to all of them by restraining the transportation of persons and 
 
 
 179. See Logan, supra note 5, at 4–5 (addressing national concerns impacted by state and local 
residency restrictions and recognizing ―the need to limit state efforts to isolate themselves from the 
collective social responsibility of ex-offender reentry‖). Cf. G.H. v. Township of Galloway, No. A-
64/65, 2009 WL 1272549 (N.J. May 7, 2009). 
 180. Id. at 34. 
 181. Id. at 40. 
 182. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978). 
 183. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 960 (1982). 
 184. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338–39 (1979). 
 185. See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) (―[I]t is settled beyond question that the 
transportation of persons is ‗commerce‘ . . . .‖). 
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property across its borders.‖186 At issue in Edwards was a California state 
law criminalizing any attempt to bring or assist bringing an indigent 
person into the state.
187
 The Court made it clear that the Constitution ―‗was 
framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several States must sink or 
swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in 
union and not division‘‖188 and that ―the relief of the needy has become the 
common responsibility and concern of the whole nation.‖189 
Managing the problem of sex offender recidivism is a national concern 
since individuals are mobile and may freely cross state borders. In 
Edwards, the state attempted to keep poor people out, while in recently 
enacted residency restrictions, states effectively push sex offenders out and 
try to keep them out. The Court in Edwards concluded that the California 
statute directed against allowing indigent individuals into the state 
―imposes an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce.‖190 In 
order to find a Dormant Commerce Clause violation imposed by state and 
local sex offender residency restrictions, the courts will need to find that 
these restrictions similarly constitute an unconstitutional burden on 
interstate commerce. Dormant Commerce Clause concepts developed in 
cases where states used traditional police powers to isolate or protect 
themselves from harm will be the most relevant to determining whether 
these restrictions unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce
191
 because 
residency restrictions have generally been enacted for the purpose of 
protecting the public health, safety, and welfare against sex offender 
recidivism.
192
 
Residency restrictions which effectively constitute banishment may 
burden interstate commerce if sex offenders are dumped into other states 
because they cannot find a place to live when their own state has enacted 
particularly restrictive conditions.
193 
This problem of dumping was 
identified in 1930 by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Baum,
 
where the court refused to allow a criminal defendant, who violated a 
liquor law, to be banished from the state during his probationary period.
194 
 
 
 186. Id. at 167. 
 187. Id. at 165–66 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2615 (West 2003)). 
 188. Id. at 174 (quoting Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1998). 
 189. Id. at 175. 
 190. Id. at 177. 
 191. See United Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 
1786, 1798 (2007) (observing that ―[t]he Counties‘ ordinances are exercises of the police power in an 
effort to address waste disposal, a typical and traditional concern of local government‖). 
 192. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76. 
 193. See generally Tewksbury, supra note 15. 
 194. People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930). 
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The court stated its rationale: 
To permit one state to dump its convict criminals into another 
would entitle the state believing itself injured thereby to exercise its 
police and military power, in the interest of its own peace, safety, 
and welfare, to repel such an invasion. It would tend to incite 
dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental 
equality of political rights among the states which is the basis of the 
Union itself.
195
 
In addition to burdening interstate commerce under a Dormant 
Commerce Clause analysis, the dumping of sex offenders into other states 
may generate tort liability between states similar to other interstate 
common law cases where a state has been allowed to ―sue for an 
injunction to restrain another state from polluting its waters or from using 
the quarantine power to injure its neighbor‘s commerce or to prevent the 
diversion of water to the injury of its citizens.‖196 Because the ―dumping‖ 
states are aware of the dangerous nature of these criminals, the harm of 
their reoffending is foreseeable and a state may be liable for expelling a 
criminal, particularly if they are still on probation or receiving an order of 
banishment in lieu of a prison sentence.
197
 
Once it is established that the regulation at issue affects interstate 
commerce, the major question in these challenges is whether the benefits 
of the state or local regulation outweigh any burdens on interstate 
commerce.
198
 This balancing is guided by ―whether the state or local law 
discriminates against out-of-staters or treats in-staters and out-of-staters 
alike.‖199 If the law discriminates against out-of-staters, it will be 
invalidated unless it is ―necessary to achieve an important [government] 
purpose.‖200 If the law is not discriminatory, it will not be unconstitutional 
unless it places a burden on interstate commerce that outweighs the law‘s 
benefits.
201
 
Assuming it can be shown that residency restrictions potentially burden 
interstate commerce, it must be determined whether these restrictions 
 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Lynch, supra note 45, at 27–28 (citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901)); see also 
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 
U.S. 125 (1902); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
 197. See Lynch, supra note 45, at 28. 
 198. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.3 (2d ed. 
2002). 
 199. Id. § 5.3.3.2. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. 
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discriminate against out-of-staters or treat them the same as in-staters. 
State and local residency restrictions are intended to restrict convicted sex 
offenders from residing, working, and sometimes just being present in 
particular geographical locations which may give them access to potential 
victims, particularly children.
202
 These restrictions are not imposed based 
on the offender‘s city, county, or state of origin, but instead are based on 
the offender‘s status as a convicted sex offender. While these restrictions 
constitute protectionism in favor of the state and local communities, they 
are not motivated by ―simple economic protectionism‖ and are not per se 
invalid as discriminatory.
203
 Thus, it is doubtful that any allegation of 
discrimination against out-of-state sex offenders would be successful 
unless the restrictions explicitly excluded in-state offenders or expressly 
targeted out-of-state offenders.
204 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court in United Haulers upheld against a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge some New York county flow control 
ordinances, which required trash haulers to bring waste to state 
government disposal facilities.
205 The Court observed that ―[d]isposing of 
trash has been a traditional government activity for years‖ and concluded 
that the flow control ordinances in this case did not discriminate against 
interstate commerce.
206 
It justified treating laws favoring public facilities 
differently from those favoring private interests over competitors by 
reference to the government‘s police power to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of the community.
207 Recognizing that ―a law favoring a 
public entity and treating all private entities the same does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce as does a law favoring local business over all 
others,‖208 the Court concluded that ―[l]aws favoring local government . . . 
may be directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to 
protectionism.‖209  
 
 
 202. See Levenson & Cotter, supra note 76. 
 203. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 
 204. See Logan, supra note 5, at 34 (noting that ―no successful [Dormant Commerce Clause] 
challenge would likely lie because the facially neutral character of exclusion laws would relegate their 
analysis to a less demanding standard of constitutional review‖). 
 205. United Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 
1790 (2007). 
 206. Id. But see id. at 1804 (Alito, J., dissenting) (disagreeing that the current case was 
distinguishable from Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), in that ― [t]he only salient 
difference between the cases is that the ordinance invalidated in Carbone discriminated in favor of a 
privately owned facility, whereas the laws at issue here discriminate in favor of facilities owned and 
operated by a state-created public benefit corporation‖ (internal quotation omitted)).  
 207. See id. at 1795 (majority opinion). 
 208. Id. at 1796 n.6. 
 209. Id. at 1796. However, in an earlier trash quarantine case, City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 
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Criminal punishment, sentencing, and establishing probationary 
conditions are also traditional government activities within the police 
power of the state and local government.
210
 Protectionism exercised by 
state and local government in favor of its citizens under the police power, 
such as with the flow control ordinances in United Haulers, is not for the 
purpose of favoring economic protectionism against competitors and is not 
discriminatory against interstate commerce. However, as Professor Logan 
notes in Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion 
Laws, ―post-confinement disposition of criminal offenders, much like care 
of the poor and disposal of waste, has become a problem of national 
concern.‖211 Consequently, states need to take responsibility for offender 
reentry and ―share in shouldering the burdens of integrating ex-offenders 
into the ranks of law-abiding society.‖212  
Residency restrictions will likely be considered nondiscriminatory and 
subject to the balancing test of whether the burdens on interstate 
commerce outweigh the benefits of the restrictions to the state or local 
communities.
213
 The balancing test articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc.
 provides that when a law ―regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a 
legitimate local public interest and its effects on interstate commerce are 
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
 
 
437 U.S. 617 (1978), the court rejected New Jersey‘s attempt to exclude out-of-state waste, finding 
that mere movement of ordinary solid waste into the state from elsewhere did not pose any particular 
problems. One might argue that this is distinguishable from the movement of convicted criminals with 
a high recidivism rate, which does pose a special problem, especially if registration statutes are not 
particularly effective. Thus, states might be able to seek to exclude out-of-state offenders on the 
grounds that they have their own offenders to deal with. These statutes would likely be facially neutral 
and certainly would not be motivated by a desire to ―protect‖ the local market for sex offenders from 
out-of-state competition. 
 210. See Logan, supra note 5, at 30 (noting that, historically, ―crime control efforts were of little 
national consequence,‖ but that ―post-confinement disposition of criminal offenders, much like care of 
the poor and disposal of waste, has become a problem of national concern‖). 
 211. Id. (emphasis added). 
 212. Id. at 31. Logan also discusses the Interstate Compact on Adult Offender Supervision, signed 
by forty-eight states and the District of Columbia, whose purpose is  
[t]hrough means of joint and cooperative action among the compacting states: to provide for 
the promotion of public safety and protect the rights of victims through the control and 
regulation of the interstate movement of offenders in the community; to provide for the 
effective tracking, supervision, and rehabilitation of these offenders by the sending and 
receiving states; and to equitably distribute the costs, benefits, and obligations of the compact 
among the compacting states. 
Id. (quoting INTERSTATE COMM‘N FOR ADULT OFFENDER SUPERVISION, BENCH BOOK FOR JUDGES 
AND COURT PERSONNEL 107 (2006)). 
 213. See id. at 34 (discussing the balancing test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 
(1970)). 
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commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.‖214 
As reaffirmed by the Court in United Haulers, legislation passed pursuant 
to the police power should not be rigorously scrutinized by the judiciary in 
order to effectuate social policy judgments.
215 
However, the burden and 
benefits should be weighed whenever state action affects national interests. 
The potential burden imposed on other states by sex offender residency 
restrictions is not incidental; it is of major concern to many citizens who 
are fearful of recidivism and who wish to keep these LUDIs out of their 
neighborhood.
216
 When state and local governments enact residency 
restrictions, which essentially banish sex offenders because of lack of 
available housing options, other states may become a dumping ground for 
neighboring states‘ criminals.217 Burdening other states by enacting 
protectionist legislation should be prohibited as a Dormant Commerce 
Clause violation, particularly given the lack of any evidence that shows 
the legislation is an effective means of reducing recidivism and the risk it 
may actually increase it. The excessive burden conferred on other states by 
effectively banishing sex offenders is not outweighed by the illusive 
benefits gained by restricting residency.
218
 And, as discussed in Part V, 
there may be alternative ways to deal with this problem that will have a 
lesser impact on interstate activities.
219
 
Professor Logan may indeed be correct in his assessment that a 
Dormant Commerce Clause claim will be doomed because courts will 
defer to state legislative decisions on public policy issues.
220
 In fact, it has 
been more than twenty-five years since the Court has struck down a case 
using the Pike balancing test.
221
 However, when these national concerns of 
protectionism are added to individual liberty challenges, disproportionate 
 
 
 214. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 215. United Haulers Ass‘n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 
(2007). 
 216. See Logan, supra note 5, at 18–19 (noting that when one state enacts residency restrictions, 
the effective result may be state-wide exclusion and ―[o]ther states, in turn, alarmed that they will 
become a magnet for ex-offenders, or if otherwise enamored of the strategy in principle, embrace 
exclusion as a social control measure‖). 
 217. See, e.g., id. at 9. 
 218. But see id. at 34–35 (concluding that ―despite the highly questionable efficacy of residence 
exclusion laws, courts applying Pike will defer to the judgment of state legislatures on their public 
policy wisdom‖) (footnote omitted)). 
 219. See infra Part V.  
 220. Logan, supra note 5, at 34–35. 
 221. One would have to develop some pretty compelling factual bases for comparing benefits to 
be successful under Pike. The strongest case would be one in which the benefits were zero or less than 
zero compared to the costs. Yet the costs in sex offender cases are not readily reducible to dollars; 
thus, courts would likely tend to stay away from the issue. 
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siting in poor and minority communities, and the fact that there is no 
evidence these restrictions are at all effective, the public may eventually 
embrace other alternatives to address their fears of sex offender 
recidivism. 
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND DISPROPORTIONATE SITING OF SEX 
OFFENDERS 
Environmental justice has been defined as ―the idea that minority and 
low-income individuals, communities, and populations should not be 
disproportionately exposed to environmental hazards, and that they should 
share fully in making the decisions that affect their environment.‖222 
Recent data have shown that sex offenders tend to disproportionately 
locate in poor, minority neighborhoods in some cities.
223
 While it is 
unclear why this disproportionate siting occurs, the residents in these 
urban communities ―are more often poor with less education; many times 
they‘re immigrants with limited English . . . [and] [s]o the public outcry 
can be muted compared to more affluent neighborhoods.‖224 In this Article, 
I propose by way of analogy that these same individuals, communities, 
and populations should not be exposed to an increased number of sex 
 
 
 222. Michael B. Gerrard, Preface to the First Edition of THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 
at xxxiii (Michael B. Gerrard & Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 223. See, e.g., S.K. Bardwell, Sex Offenders Clustering in Poor Neighborhoods, HOUS. CHRON., 
Jan. 25, 2003, at A1 (identifying the growing concern troubling ―many cities: clusters of sex offenders 
that infect low-income neighborhoods‖); Dennis & Waite, supra note 40 (noting that ―offenders 
cluster in poor neighborhoods, staying in motels, apartments, mobile homes or anywhere that will take 
them‖); Lori Rackl & Chris Fusco, Nothing More Vile than Sex Offenders: Governor Will Make Rules 
Tougher Starting Today, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 7 (stating that idea to prohibit more than 
one sex offender from living at the same address ―grew out of Corrections Department data that 
showed paroled sex offenders were being clustered in group homes in poor South Side 
neighborhoods‖); Editorial, Protection from Predators, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2005, at 18 (noting that 
―[a] Tribune analysis found that a large number of sex offenders released from prison are concentrated 
in a handful of poor, African-American neighborhoods of Chicago‖). But see Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 
700, 724 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding district court factual findings regarding housing availability under 
Iowa‘s residency restrictions: ―[s]ex offenders are completely banned from living in a number of 
Iowa‘s small towns and cities. In the state‘s major communities, offenders are relegated to living in 
industrial areas, in some of the cities‘ most expensive developments, or on the very outskirts of town 
where available housing is limited.‖); Scott Jason, 31 Sex Offenders Arrested in Sweep, MERCED SUN-
STAR (Cal.), Oct. 14, 2006, at 1 (quoting Merced County Sheriff‘s spokesman Rich Howard as saying 
―[t]here‘s not a neighborhood in the county that‘s immune to [sex offenders] . . . [f]rom upper middle 
class to the really poor neighborhoods, it‘s pretty evenly spread‖). 
 224. Associated Press, Released Sex Offenders Cluster in Minneapolis, GRAND FORKS HERALD 
(N.D.), Feb. 7, 2004, at 6 (noting that Minneapolis Police Offender Notification Supervisor Jon 
Hinchliff ―thinks one alternative is to funnel offenders to a designated site outside of residential areas‖ 
which is similar to the idea of banishment). 
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offenders in their community without having a voice about the effect on 
their neighborhoods. 
The landmark genesis of the concept of environmental justice was a 
1987 report, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States, prepared by the 
Commission on Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ.
225
 This 
report purported to expose ―the gross disregard for people of color as toxic 
waste landfills were sited in their communities throughout the nation.‖226 
Governmental siting of a sex offender in a community as a LUDI through 
residency restrictions barring them from other neighborhoods is analogous 
to the governmental siting of toxic landfills as LULUs through 
government permitting and regulation. This Part will explore how lessons 
from environmental justice concerns about toxic landfills can inform those 
communities which experience the ―dumping‖ of sex offenders in their 
neighborhoods. 
The major controversy in the environmental justice movement has been 
whether the overconcentration of LULUs in minority communities is the 
result of economics, in that land in these neighborhoods may be less 
expensive, or the result of either overt or indirect racial discrimination.
227
 
A 2001 California study on the issue of which came first, toxic facilities or 
minority move-in, concluded that the siting of toxic facilities was most 
directly associated with ―[d]emographics reflecting political weakness—
including a higher presence of minorities, a lower presence of home 
owners, or a significant degree of ethic churning.‖228 
A 2006 study by University of Michigan and University of Montana 
researchers found that by applying alternate methods to assess disparities 
in the location of environmental hazards, race seemed to matter more than 
previous studies had revealed.
229
 The researchers determined that while 
―national studies using the traditional method report that mostly 
occupational variables—not racial variables—are significant predictors of 
 
 
 225. Rev. M. Linda Jaramillo, Foreword to ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF 
CHRIST JUSTICE & WITNESS MINISTRIES, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at vii 
(2007). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See Manuel Pastor, Jr. et al., Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-In, and 
Environmental Justice, 23 J. URB. AFF. 1, 2 (2001) (noting that ―[d]espite the ongoing response at the 
policy level, the research on disproportionate exposure by race has yielded mixed results‖). 
 228. Id. at 19. See also id. (also concluding that the best way to address environmental justice 
concerns from a policy standpoint is to continue ―building social capital across ethnic lines by an 
explicit commitment to a people of color movement‖). 
 229. See University of Michigan News Service, Study Reveals a Disproportionately High Number 
of Minorities and Poor Live Near Toxic Waste Facilities (May 19, 2006), http://www.ns.umich.edu/ 
htdocs/releases/story.php?id=259.  
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the locations of these facilities,‖ this traditional method of analysis ―‗has 
largely camouflaged racial and economic disparities that are much larger 
than previously reported.‘‖230 Finally, the most recent comprehensive 
study of this issue, Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty: 1987—2007, 
prepared for the United Church of Christ Justice & Witness Ministries, 
purports to find ―clear evidence of racism where toxic waste sites are 
located and the way government responds to toxic contamination 
emergencies in people of color communities.‖231 
Just as ―[p]olluting industries still follow the path of least resistance‖232 
and locate LULUs in communities ―where land, labor and lives are 
cheap‖233 and regulatory protections are weak, LUDI sex offenders often 
locate in these same communities because rent prices are cheap, landlords 
are willing to accept sex offenders, they are homeless, a social services 
department is placing them there, and the community lacks the political 
strength to resist.
234 
Problems experienced by sex offenders in trying to re-
enter a community, such as unemployment and social exclusion resulting 
from public identification, can also result in ―many of them end[ing] up 
living in socially disorganized, economically deprived neighborhoods that 
have fewer resources for deterring crime and protecting residents.‖235 
Research has shown that registered sex offenders do not appear to live in 
these areas by choice, but are instead more likely to be relegated to these 
poorer communities, ―characterized by economic disadvantage, lack of 
physical resources, relatively little social capital, and high levels of social 
disorganization.‖236 Public policy choices in deciding whether to 
implement sex offender residency restrictions must take into account the 
unintended consequences of forcing these ―banished‖ individuals into less 
politically powerful communities, which are more vulnerable to an 
overconcentration of LULUs and LUDIs. 
Those organizations protecting economically disadvantaged and 
minority communities from environmental hazards should also apply 
pressure to policy makers to protect these same communities from other 
types of LULU overconcentrations, such as liquor outlets,
237 
and from sex 
 
 
 230. Id. (quoting Paul Mohai discussing study appearing in May 2006 issue of Demography). 
 231. Jaramillo, supra note 225, at vii. 
 232. ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST JUSTICE & WITNESS MINISTRIES, 
TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT TWENTY: 1987–2007, at xii (2007). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Bain & German, supra note 37. 
 235. Levenson et al., supra note 5, at 4 (internal citations omitted). 
 236. Tewksbury, supra note 15, at 535. 
 237. See Shelley Ross Saxer, “Down with Demon Drink!”: Strategies for Resolving Liquor Outlet 
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offenders, particularly those identified as LUDIs. In addition to informing 
and influencing political decision makers about these issues, communities 
should explore other environmental justice theories to determine if they 
are appropriate to address these disproportionate risks. Although equal 
protection challenges have been generally unsuccessful in the 
environmental justice movement because of the need to show intentional 
discrimination,
238
 other environmental justice theories, such as Fair 
Housing Act claims, could prove successful for addressing 
overconcentration concerns.
239
 Claims under Title VI,
240
 which provides 
that programs discriminating on the basis of race are not entitled to 
funding from federal agencies and departments, have been limited in 
effectiveness for environmental racism claims by recent court decisions 
and agency regulations, which also require a showing of intentional 
discrimination.
241
 
Under Executive Order 12,898, issued by President Clinton in 1994, all 
federal agencies must ―collect data about the health and environmental 
impact of their actions on minority groups and low-income populations 
and develop policies to achieve environmental justice ‗[t]o the greatest 
extent practicable and permitted by law.‘‖242 The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal agencies have made major 
strides in adopting environmental justice strategies and encouraging 
greater communication with, and participation by, minorities and low-
income communities when government actions affect these populations.
243
 
However, more than ten years later, there are concerns as to how well 
these agencies have implemented their environmental justice strategies, 
and ―[t]he challenge of fulfilling the order‘s goals remains unfinished.‖244  
 
 
Overconcentration in Urban Areas, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 123 (1994). 
 238. See Philip Weinberg, Equal Protection, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 222, at 3, 13 (noting that ―the intent requirement has proven an obstacle to many, though not all, 
environmental justice suits based on equal protection assertions‖). 
 239. Colin Crawford, Other Civil Right Titles, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra 
note 222, at 67, 67 (citing civil rights attorney, the late Ralph Santiago Abascal, as stating that civil 
rights claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) may be more likely to achieve success than those 
claims litigated under Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection). 
 240. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
 241. See Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 222, 
at 23, 23–25. 
 242. Bradford C. Mank, Executive Order 12,898, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 222, at 101, 101 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994)). 
 243. Id. at 142. 
 244. Id. at 143 (noting that state and local regulators will need to spend more time evaluating 
environmental impact on these communities and considering alternative sites and mitigation before 
issuing permits). 
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While it might be symbolically helpful to obtain an Executive Order 
requiring that federal agencies take into account whether their actions tend 
to encourage an overconcentration of sex offenders in low-income and 
minority communities, it is doubtful that such an order would be effective 
since it could not be applied to state and local actions that restrict sex 
offender residency in such a way as to encourage their movement into 
these communities. Instead, community advocates might focus on 
exploring state environmental justice programs and policies directed at the 
state and local level to see if similar policies could be developed to address 
the disproportionate siting of sex offenders in poor, minority 
neighborhoods.
245 
 
Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims under Title VIII may present the most 
viable civil rights approach to protect minority communities from actions 
that encourage sex offenders to locate in their neighborhoods because 
discriminatory intent is not required, only a showing of discriminatory 
effect.
246 
While legislators may have intentionally discriminated against 
sex offenders when enacting residency restrictions,
247
 this discrimination 
has only indirectly had an impact on those communities protected by the 
FHA. Environmental justice plaintiffs have focused on three FHA 
sections: 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 3617.
248
  
Under § 3604(a), it is unlawful ―[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the 
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental 
of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person 
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.‖249 
This section can be used to challenge actions by individuals or 
governmental units that directly affect the availability of housing for 
communities of color. Claims that certain actions have caused such 
neighborhoods to deteriorate and decline in property value have been 
rejected
250 
and courts have refused to extend § 3604(a) to cover claims 
 
 
 245. See Nicholas Targ & Steven G. Bonorris, State Environmental Justice Programs and Related 
Authority, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, supra note 222, at 157, 157–98 (describing 
various state programs). 
 246. See Colin Crawford, Other Civil Rights Titles, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, 
supra note 222, at 67, 68. 
 247. For a review of how legislative debates analogized the sex offender concerns to ―toxic 
waste,‖ see Logan, supra note 5, at 5–12 & nn.17–69 and accompanying text, and Dan Filler, Making 
the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 346–62 (2001). 
 248. Crawford, supra note 246, at 69–78. 
 249. Id. at 69 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000)). 
 250. Id. (citing Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass‘n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 
1207, 1209 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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such as siting decisions involving LULUs because Section 3604(a) does 
not protect ―intangible interests in the already-owned property.‖251 
However, it may be possible for a plaintiff to claim that if siting a LULU 
―‗would result in greater segregation in the community by discouraging 
whites from living in the neighborhood, § 3604(a) might apply, despite the 
already-owned property exclusion.‘‖252 
Communities receiving an overconcentration of sex offenders could 
allege a § 3604(a) violation by showing that residency regulations or 
private restrictions directed against sex offenders have pushed LUDIs into 
their neighborhoods and have directly limited housing opportunities for 
people of color.
253
 Suppose an affluent neighborhood agrees to enforce a 
private covenant that prohibits any homeowner from selling to a convicted 
sex offender. A convicted sex offender who would otherwise have moved 
there because he has family in the neighborhood must now find an 
apartment in a nearby community that consists of subsidized housing 
projects occupied by primarily African American and Hispanic families. If 
one of the neighbors in this apartment complex challenges the 
enforceability of the private covenant under the Fair Housing Act
254
 on the 
theory that court enforcement of the covenant would have an adverse 
impact on her family and those similarly situated, would this challenge be 
viable?  
A similar FHA claim was made in Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant 
Block Association, Inc. v. Cuomo
255 
by a community organization, which 
asserted constitutional violations along with a § 3604(a) claim based on 
the intentional and discriminatory siting of homeless shelters in a minority 
area.
256
 Although the court dismissed the FHA claim, it based the 
dismissal on the plaintiff‘s failure to show that siting these LULUs directly 
affected housing availability for people of color.
257
 Therefore, it may be 
possible for communities of color to assert such a claim for the 
overconcentration of LUDIs if they have sufficient evidence to show that 
government or private actions restricting residency of sex offenders 
 
 
 251. Id. at. 69 (internal quotation omitted). 
 252. Id. at 71–72 (quoting Vicki Been, Environmental Justice and Equity Issues, in ZONING AND 
LAND USE CONTROLS, § 25D.05[1][a][i] & n.17 (Patrick Rohan ed., 1995)). 
 253. Id. at 70. 
 254. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
 255. Coal. of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass‘n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
 256. Id. at 1206–08. 
 257. Id. at 1208 n.2. 
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directly affects the availability of housing for minority neighborhoods.
258
 
In addition, a § 3604(a) claim may be based on showing that the 
―dumping‖ of sex offenders in minority neighborhoods ―‗would result in 
greater segregation in the community by discouraging whites from living 
in the neighborhood,‘‖259 or ―had the effect of making housing unavailable 
by forcing members of a protected class to leave an area.‖260 
Department of Housing and Urban Development regulations may also 
be used to support a § 3604(a) claim based on discriminatory housing 
practices, which might rely on sex offender registration and residency 
restrictions.
261
 One of the provisions intended to help define the phrase 
―otherwise make unavailable or deny‖262 in a § 3604(a) claim states: 
It shall be unlawful, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin, to restrict or attempt to restrict 
the choices of a person by word or conduct in connection with 
seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a dwelling so as to 
perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate segregated housing patterns, or to 
discourage or obstruct choices in a community, neighborhood or 
development.
263
 
Under this provision, minority neighborhoods may be able to argue that 
residency restrictions (either public or private) disproportionately pushing 
sex offenders into their neighborhoods have discouraged or obstructed 
choices in a community saturated with LUDIs. Such an assertion may 
support a FHA claim against local government or private homeowner 
associations with restrictive covenants prohibiting sex offenders.
264
 In 
addition, ―if a real estate agent discourages a prospective buyer or renter 
by exaggerating drawbacks or failing to inform [that prospective buyer or 
renter] of desirable features of a dwelling or of a community, 
neighborhood, or development,‖ he may be subject to an FHA violation 
claim.
265
 Such a claim would be possible if it could be alleged that the 
 
 
 258. Crawford, supra note 246, at 70–71. 
 259. Id. at 71–72 (quoting Been, supra note 252, § 25D.05[1][a][i] & n.17); see also id. at n.35 
(noting that ―[t]he Southend reasoning also might not bar a Sec. 3604(a) claim regarding the harm a 
siting does its neighbors if the neighbors could prove that the siting had the intent or effect of driving 
people of color from the community‖) (quoting Been, supra note 252, at 25D.05[1][a][i] & n.17). 
 260. Id. at 72 (citing Avery v. City of Chicago, 501 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1978)). 
 261. Id. (citing 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.50–100.304 (1988)). 
 262. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2000). 
 263. Crawford, supra note 246, at 72 (emphasis added) (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(a) (1988)). 
 264. Id. (suggesting that environmental justice plaintiffs consider using such arguments when 
multiple LULUs have been sited in their neighborhoods). 
 265. Id. at 73 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 100.70(c)(1)–(2) (1988)). 
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agent discouraged a prospective white buyer or renter from investing in a 
minority neighborhood by using the sex offender registry, instead of racial 
or ethnic references, as a way to promote segregated housing.
266
 
Section 3604(b) offers a potential litigation strategy for minority 
neighborhoods suffering from an overconcentration of sex offenders. This 
section makes it unlawful ―[t]o discriminate against any person in the 
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the 
provision of service or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, 
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.‖267 Under this 
section, owners and renters of already-acquired property may be able to 
bring an action against public entities for ―discriminating against [them] 
‗in connection‘ with ‗the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental 
of a dwelling‘‖ by diminishing their property values as a result of dumping 
sex offenders into their communities of color based on residency 
restrictions.
268
 
Federal courts have narrowly interpreted the statutory phrase 
―provision of services‖269 to apply to ―‗services generally provided by 
governmental units such as police and fire protection or garbage 
collection.‘‖270 Therefore, it may be difficult to successfully claim that 
municipal actions restricting the residency of sex offenders is a provision 
of service unless the range of services generally provided by local 
governments can be expanded under this interpretation to include the 
typical police power purposes of promoting the health, safety, and general 
welfare of the community.
271
 Additionally, some courts have indicated 
receptiveness to § 3604(b) claims by environmental justice plaintiffs, 
noting that exclusionary zoning actions would be subject to FHA 
challenges and municipal decisions siting LULUs in already 
disproportionately burdened communities of color may be legally 
questionable.
272
 This receptiveness to environmental justice claims 
 
 
 266. See id. (suggesting the use of this regulatory provision for environmental justice advocates if 
noxious uses in the minority neighborhood are used for such a discriminatory practice). 
 267. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)). 
 268. See id. at 74 (discussing potential claims under § 3604(b) by environmental justice plaintiffs 
claiming ―that a proposed incinerator or waste disposal and storage facility would diminish her 
property values and thus discriminate against her ‗in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale‘‖ 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b)). 
 269. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 270. Crawford, supra note 246, at 74 (quoting Southend Neighborhood Improvement Ass‘n v. 
County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
 271. See id. at 75 (questioning whether zoning is a service ―generally provided‖). 
 272. See id. at 75–76 (citing Oak Ridge Care Ctr., Inc. v. Racine County, 896 F. Supp. 867, 872–
73 (E.D. Wis. 1995)). 
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involving the disproportionate siting of LULUs may also signal a 
receptiveness to FHA claims involving the ―dumping‖ of sex offenders on 
minority neighborhoods. 
The third potential FHA claim environmental justice litigants may 
consider is § 3617. This section provides: 
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with 
any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his 
having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or 
encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any 
right granted or protected by . . . [inter alia] Section 3604 of this 
title.
273
 
While a § 3617 claim may be advantageous to environmental justice 
litigants because it has a broad reach and can be used to sue ―defendants 
other than housing providers and governmental entities,‖274 there does not 
appear to be an obvious potential value to minority communities wishing 
to prevent the dumping of sex offenders in their neighborhood as a result 
of residential restrictions. One possibility for such an FHA challenge is if 
neighbors protest against the siting of a halfway house for sex offenders 
and they are harassed, threatened, or sued by the siting entity for 
protesting, they may have the right to assert a § 3617 claim in response.
275
 
FHA civil rights challenges may be an effective tool for communities 
of color to prevent the dumping of sex offenders in their neighborhoods 
because of residency restrictions enacted and enforced by more politically 
powerful municipalities and private associations. Although FHA claims 
have also been asserted in favor of sex offenders and against community 
agitators, this Article does not address potential FHA claims against 
community protesters who interfere with housing projects for individuals 
protected by the act, such as disabled individuals,
276
 or the claims of sex 
offenders alleging FHA violations.
277
 
 
 
 273. Id. at 77 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3617). 
 274. Id. at 78. 
 275. See id. (discussing potential scenario in which ―community group was opposing the proposed 
siting of a low-level radioactive waste dump and also working concurrently to develop low-income 
housing in a predominantly Latino-American neighborhood‖ and suggesting that ―if the prospective 
dumper then filed a so-called SLAPP suit against the community group, the community group in turn 
might have grounds to successfully advance a Section 3617 claim‖). 
 276. See, e.g., Garrett Therolf, Protester of Group Home Is Targeted, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, 
at B1 (HUD opened an investigation against a woman who protested a group home for the 
developmentally disabled that was purported to be accepting sex offenders as well). 
 277. See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 153 (Colo. 2003) (upholding on state 
preemption grounds, rather than on FHA grounds, the lower court decision that an ordinance which 
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Concerns about the siting of environmental hazards in neighborhoods 
of color have motivated the development of the environmental justice 
movement, and there are both public policy and litigation mechanisms 
these communities can use to protect themselves from such risks. These 
same neighborhoods have also suffered from the disproportionate siting of 
sex offenders, which at a minimum, has resulted in a decrease in property 
values as more people become aware of sex offender registries and as 
residency restrictions force more sex offenders into the homeless 
population.
278
 Impacted communities should have a voice to protect 
themselves against the isolationist states, local regulations, and private 
associations attempting to protect their own communities against sex 
offenders. 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Sex offender registration statutes may be valuable and constitutionally 
valid; however, residency restrictions, which effectively attempt to banish 
sex offenders, are problematic in several ways.
279
 They arguably violate 
civil rights of sex offenders, exhibit protectionist behavior in violation of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, effectively banish sex offenders into 
poorer, minority communities with less political power to object, and there 
is no evidence that they are effective in protecting against recidivism 
concerns.
280 
Enacting residency restrictions is a politically popular 
 
 
prohibits registered sex offenders from living together in a single-family residence ―discriminates on 
the basis of familial status in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601‖); Megan A. 
Janicki, Better Seen than Herded: Residency Restrictions and Global Positioning System Tracking 
Laws for Sex Offenders, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 285, 287 (2007) (noting that sex offenders are not 
protected under the Fair Housing Act). 
 278. For example, in the two years after California passed Proposition 83, an initiative that 
imposed harsh restrictions on where sex offenders could live, the number of homeless sex offenders on 
parole shot up sixty percent. See Michael Rothfeld, Homeless Sex Offenders on Parole Jumps Sharply, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2008, at B2. 
 279. See Logan, supra note 11, at 338 (observing that registration and notification ―laws have 
proven enormously popular with the public and legislators, yet their effects remain largely unexplored 
and untested‖). But see Richard Tewksbury & Matthew B. Lees, Perceptions of Punishment: How 
Registered Sex Offenders View Registries, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 380, 402 (2007) (discussing study 
results indicating that sex offenders generally believe a sex offender registry can be effective in 
promoting public safety, but were ―divided in their views regarding the practicality of sex offender 
registries‖ and saw the main weakness in the existing systems to be ―the failure to distinguish among 
different types of sex offenders‖); Blair Anthony Robertson, Illuminating a Dark Subject, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 6, 2005, at A3 (discussing various views as to whether ―public notification 
like this reduces sex offending or makes the community safer‖) (internal quotation omitted).  
 280. See, e.g., Margaret Troia, Note, Ohio’s Sex Offender Residency Restriction Law: Does It 
Protect the Health and Safety of the State’s Children or Falsely Make People Believe So?, 19 J.L. & 
HEALTH 331, 370 (2004–05) (concluding that ―Ohio‘s sex offender residency law places unjustified 
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response to citizen concerns about the dangers of sexual offender 
recidivism in a community.
281
 Nevertheless, this legislation promotes ―a 
false sense of security, lulling parents and children into the big-bad-man 
mindset when many molesters are in fact trusted authority figures or 
family members.‖282 Given the legal and practical problems with residency 
restrictions
283
 identified in the sections above, alternative approaches to 
dealing with the important concerns and fears about sex offender 
recidivism should be examined. 
There are two major approaches to dealing with sex offenders—the 
criminal approach and the mental illness approach.
284 
Under the criminal 
approach, confinement and monitoring are important tools to manage the 
sex offender, whom we expect to reoffend if released back into society.
285 
Under the mental illness approach, various treatment methodologies are 
explored to rehabilitate the offender so that he or she can reenter the 
community without risking the public safety.
286 
Certainly, both of these 
approaches can be used simultaneously—convicted sex offenders should 
receive appropriate treatment while incapacitated in order to reduce the 
 
 
burdens on sex offenders and increases the chances for recidivism‖); see also MINN. DEP‘T OF 
CORRECTIONS, LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES: REPORT TO THE 
LEGISLATURE 11 (2003) (findings noted that ―[t]here is no evidence in Minnesota that residential 
proximity to schools or parks affects re-offense‖ and also that ―[t]he result of proximity restrictions 
would be to limit most level three offenders to rural, suburban, or industrial areas‖); Richard B. 
Krueger, Opinion, The New American Witch Hunt: It Makes Little Sense to Demonize Sex Offenders 
Rather Than Treat Their Problems, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2007, at M1 (suggesting that public policy 
approaches to sex offenses need to be reexamined and that we need to ―develop empirically based, 
scientifically sound measures and treatments‖). 
 281. See Durling, supra note 5. 
 282. Simon, supra note 25, at 149 (quoting Ann Quindlen, So What If Law Isn’t Fair to Sex 
Offenders? Children Come First, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 8, 1994, at 13). 
 283. See Rothfeld, supra note 80 (noting that ―[t]he law voters passed to crack down on sex 
offenders could actually be increasing the danger such offenders pose by driving them into 
homelessness at a significant rate‖ according to California‘s Sex Offender Management Board). 
 284. See Morse, supra note 30, at 165–70 (discussing differences between the moral model and 
medical model as responses to sexual misconduct); Robert F. Schopp, “Even A Dog . . .”: Culpability, 
Condemnation, and Respect For Persons, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 183, 194 (expressing concern that sexual 
predator statutes ―undermin[e] the distinction between criminal justice and mental health institutions 
of social control‖); see also Bruce J. Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Assessment of Sexually 
Violent Predator Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 317, 318 (observing that sex offender policy ―has fluctuated 
between two polar approaches,‖ subjecting sex offenders to criminal punishment under a criminal 
model and labeling them as ―‗sexual psychopaths‘‖ under an illness model). 
 285. Winick, supra note 284, at 319 (discussing the criminal approach which ―imposes criminal 
incarceration as a means of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution‖). 
 286. Id. (discussing the new illness model which determines that a sex offender‘s ―mental 
abnormality renders them unable to control their strong urges to engage in violent sexual conduct‖). 
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risk of reoffense.
287 
Risk assessment and management are critical under 
either of these approaches, but because the risk depends upon individual 
behavior, the risk assessment must be individualized and the appropriate 
approach utilized.
288 
General residency restrictions are not individualized 
risk assessments and appear to be only a political response without any 
proven effectiveness.
289
 
A. The Criminal Approach: Confinement & Monitoring 
Assessing risk for sex offender recidivism is the primary justification 
for responding to conduct through confinement and monitoring under the 
criminal model.
290 
Policy makers have inaccurately assumed (1) that 
stranger sex offenders target neighborhood children, when studies have 
found that between eighty and ninety percent of sex offenses are 
committed by relatives, friends, and people in authority,
291
 and (2) that 
recidivism rates for sex offenders are higher than for other felons, when 
some studies have indicated lower recidivism rates for sex offenders.
292
 
The belief that risk assessment is not accurate has also allowed judges, 
juries, and experts to have wide discretion in deciding what level of risk 
justifies the deprivation of personal liberty.
293
 However, technologies, such 
as actuarial risk assessment instruments,
294
 are improving such that the risk 
 
 
 287. Id. (concluding that ―on balance, a criminal approach that offers treatment in prison on a 
voluntary basis is preferable to the new sexual predator statutory schemes‖); see also Roxanne Lieb, 
State Policy Perspectives on Sexual Predator Laws, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY 
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 41, 58 (concluding that 
existing sexual predator approaches ―operate in a no-man‘s land between mental hospitals and prisons, 
mixing laws, procedures, and working cultures from each‖).  
 288. See Durling, supra note 5, at 349–50 (observing that judges and scholars are critical of the 
more general residency restrictions and have advocated an individualized approach based on risk 
assessment). 
 289. See Lucy Berliner, Victim and Citizen Perspectives on Sexual Offender Policy, 989 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 464, 473 (2003) (concluding that ―[s]exual offender experts can and should be 
important contributors to social policy regarding what happens to sexual offenders‖). 
 290. Eric S. Janus, Legislative Responses to Sexual Violence: An Overview, 989 ANNALS N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 247, 252–53 (2003) (noting that the ability of mental health experts to determine risk of 
reoffense may be better than believed by those seeking confinement to avoid assessment inaccuracy). 
 291. See Durling, supra note 5, at 329–32. In fact, according to some studies, this number could 
exceed ninety percent. See Simon, supra note 25, at 149–50. 
 292. See Durling, supra note 5, at 329–32. 
 293. Janus, supra note 290, at 253. 
 294. Actuarial risk assessment typically appears in the context of statistically calculating risk for 
insurance companies, but the method can be applied in a judicial context for sex offenders. See Eric S. 
Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, 
Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1454 (2003). Using statistics, actuarial 
scales are developed for groups of released sex offenders, both groups that reoffend and those with no 
subsequent convictions. Id. Utilizing these known outcomes, actuaries can determine which predictor 
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of recidivism may be more accurately measured, predicted, and 
communicated to help balance public safety and personal liberty.
295
 Using 
a risk management model, instead of relying only on a risk prediction 
model, will likely be more accurate and helpful to legal decision makers 
and will give offenders an incentive to modify their behavior in order to 
gain or retain their liberty interests.
296 
 
Based on either a general risk assessment model or on an 
individualized assessment, decision makers determine how best to 
minimize the risk to the public from sex offenders who are expected to 
reoffend.
297
 The perceived risk to public safety will likely govern whether 
the sex offender is subjected to the criminal model, the illness model, or a 
combination of the two. Confinement and/or monitoring to guard against 
the risk of reoffense can be achieved through extended or indeterminate 
prison terms, civil commitment, and Global Positioning System (GPS) 
monitoring. These alternatives, combined with voluntary cognitive 
behavioral therapy, in and out of confinement, should replace residency 
restrictions, and possibly registration statutes, which may actually increase 
recidivism because they tend to be psychologically damaging to sex 
offenders and counterproductive to rehabilitation.
298
 
Isolation and quarantine laws are justified by the government‘s duty to 
protect public health similar to the government‘s use of civil confinement 
to reduce the risk to public safety from sex offender conduct.
299
 In both 
 
 
variables best forecast which offenders will reoffend and which offenders will not. Id. The predictor 
variables are then weighted accordingly, combined to form a scale, and after sufficient testing and 
checking, the scale can be used to provide ―probabilistic estimates of reoffense for each score, or range 
of scores, for different time frames,‖ typically expressed as a percentage of sex offenders predicted to 
reoffend. Id. 
 295. Id. at 255–56 (noting that improved risk assessment techniques may have adverse, 
unintended consequences because public policy still needs to decide who bears the known risk and it 
may diminish personal accountability); see also Hanson et al., supra note 19, at 164 (suggesting that 
weather forecasting may be a helpful model in determining how best to use prediction models in order 
to ―improve the assessment and management of sexual offenders‖); Harris & Rice, supra note 23, at 
207–08 (concluding that ―no studies of sex offender recidivism yet published have included treatments 
with substantial ability to lower recidivism‖ and therefore clinicians need ―to carefully assess risk and 
manage offenders‖ until appropriate therapies are found); Commentary, Risk Assessment: Discussion 
of the Section, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 236, 236–46 (2003) (presenting commentary by scholars 
of research literature on risk assessment of sex offender recidivism). 
 296. Winick, supra note 284, at 222–23. 
 297. Id. at 317–18. 
 298. Id. at 328–29 (arguing that ―[s]exually violent predator laws should be repealed or not 
adopted in states that do not presently have them‖ because they carry ―high fiscal costs and 
antitherapeutic consequences‖ such that ―the negative effects of these laws far exceed their positive 
value‖ as compared to extended imprisonment through the criminal punishment model). 
 299. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997) (comparing civil confinement of 
sexually violent offenders to ―involuntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly 
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situations, there is a tension between protecting the public and respecting 
individual liberty and privacy interests.
300 
Public health experts have 
―recommend[ed] the following criteria to assess the ethical and legal 
justification for isolation and quarantine: scientific assessment of risk, 
targeting restrictive measures, a safe and humane environment, fair 
treatment and social justice, procedural due process, and the least 
restrictive alternative.‖301 Policy makers addressing sex offender 
recidivism concerns for public safety should use very similar criteria to 
address confinement and restriction of sex offenders. However, in viewing 
sex offenders as a problem similar to infectious disease, we may 
exacerbate the current regulatory approaches to sex offenders which look 
to the goal of ―waste management‖ and apply punitive policies to 
transform the sex offender ―crime as disease back to an earlier conception 
of crime as monstrosity.‖302  
Longer, determinate sentencing is one approach to dealing with sex 
offenders under a precautionary principle model.
303
 Because we are still 
lacking definitive information as to treatment effectiveness and the 
predictability of reoffense, public policy may encourage longer prison 
terms for sexual offenses in order to confine these individuals and shift the 
risk of harm away from the general public.
304
 Indeterminate sentencing 
 
 
contagious disease‖); see also Morse, supra note 30, at 170 (suggesting that ―a purely preventive 
regime in which confinement is authorized for dangerousness alone, untied to culpability or 
nonresponsibility‖ could be used instead of distinguishing between civil and criminal confinement and 
that ―[t]his would be a scheme of ‗behavioral quarantine,‘ analogous to medical quarantine to prevent 
the spread of infectious disease‖). 
 300. See Ronald Bayer & James Colgrove, Rights and Dangers: Bioterrorism and the Ideologies 
of Public Health, in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 289, 289 (Ronald 
Bayer et al. eds., 2007) (discussing the historical controversy over state restrictions on liberty to 
protect against public health threats); see also Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges 
Posed by Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, in PUBLIC HEALTH ETHICS: THEORY, POLICY, AND 
PRACTICE, supra, at 261, 261. 
 When severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) first appeared in 2003, and even earlier in the 
1980s when the HIV/AIDS pandemic arose, public health approaches included reporting, surveillance, 
isolation, and quarantine. Gostin et al., supra, at 261. Similarly, public safety approaches to sex 
offenders have included registration, monitoring, confinement, and residency restrictions. In each case 
the precautionary principle may be applied to guide decision making in light of incomplete knowledge 
and information about the risk to public health and safety. See id. at 265. 
 301. Gostin et al., supra note 300, at 269. 
 302. Simon, supra note 37, at 304. 
 303. Morse, supra note 30, at 172 (observing that ―it is within the state‘s power to reduce sexual 
offense recidivism by criminal sentences‖). 
 304. See, e.g., James L. Johnson, Sex Offenders on Federal Community Supervision: Factors that 
Influence Revocation, FED. PROBATION, June 2006, at 18 (2006) (noting that ―State legislators and 
Congress have instituted legislation that mandates sex offender registration and public notification, 
longer prison sentences for certain sexual crimes, and stricter enforcement of existing laws‖); Ronnie 
Hall, Note, In the Shadowlands: Fisher and the Outpatient Civil Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
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and civil confinement are semi-criminal model approaches for dealing 
with the sex offender recidivism risk. However, civil confinement under 
sexually violent predator (SVP) laws may generate high costs from 
unnecessary and expensive confinement, which will be required to meet 
constitutional standards for treatment since civil confinement is not 
intended to be punitive.
305
 As one commentator has noted, tragedies 
resulting from dangerous people being released from confinement ―can be 
entirely prevented only by exceptionally harsh and probably 
disproportionate sentences or by an expanded scheme of civil 
commitment. The former will be unjust and expensive. The latter will 
threaten the liberty of all and will be both unjust and expensive.‖306 
Civil commitment of sex offenders is currently provided for in more 
than fifteen states.
307
 Commitment was initially viewed in earlier 
legislation as an opportunity for treatment of sex offenders in lieu of a 
prison sentence; however, more recent enactments and revisions have not 
been rehabilitative in nature, but have instead been guided by attempts to 
confine sex offenders for as long as possible to minimize the risk to public 
safety from recidivism.
308
 Civil commitment laws for sexually violent 
predators have been upheld against constitutional challenges,
309
 but 
 
 
Predators” in Texas, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 175, 212 (2006) (suggesting that longer prison terms 
might be a better alternative than outpatient civil commitment); Allison Morgan, Note, Civil 
Confinement of Sex Offenders: New York’s Attempt to Push the Envelope in the Name of Public Safety, 
86 B.U. L. REV. 1001, 1017 (2006) (―[I]t is paradoxical to hold a person responsible for his acts during 
his prison term and then determine that he is unable to control himself after that term has been 
completed.‖). 
 305. See Lieb, supra note 287, at 55 (noting that Washington was required to invest significant 
funds into treatment facilities under the SVP program in order to meet constitutional requirements). 
Washington, the first state to enact a post-sentence commitment law for sex offenders, did so in 1990 
after a ―task force concluded that sentence increases alone were an insufficient remedy to prevent 
dangerous sex offenders from committing new sex crimes after their release from prison.‖ Id. at 43–
44. In response to the high costs resulting from the SVP statute, Washington lawmakers in 2001 
enacted indeterminate civil commitment sentencing for violent sex offenders, allowing judges to 
impose maximum sentences under the guidelines for a SVP or order a minimum prison term. Id. at 55–
56.  
 306. Morse, supra note 30, at 180. 
 307. W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States: Legislative and 
Policy Concerns, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 489, 490 (2003). Civil commitment is allowed in all 
states for the involuntary hospitalization of the mentally ill, but it is ―[g]enerally reserved for 
individuals with serious psychiatric disorders . . . [and] when an individual‘s symptoms become acute 
and place the individual at imminent risk of serious harm.‖ Id. at 489. It is also allowed for 
―individuals charged with a criminal offense and found to be incompetent to stand trial or not 
criminally responsible (legally ‗insane‘).‖ Id. 
 308. Id. at 490. 
 309. See Bourquez v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 149–52 (Ct. App. 2007) (upholding 
California‘s Sexually Violent Predators Act, as amended by SB 1128 and by Proposition 83 to change 
the commitment term to an indeterminate term, as applied to SVPs confined prior to enactment of the 
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continue to be controversial in the legal and the therapeutic 
communities.
310
 The legality and efficacy of these laws continue to be 
subject to criticism,
311
 but they are certainly an alternative to residency 
restrictions if specifically directed to those dangerous sexual predators 
who are the most likely to seriously reoffend. Nevertheless, states are 
finding that the cost of civil commitment and monitoring is high and 
government agencies are exploring treatment options to avoid confinement 
and recidivism.
312
 
The advantage of using civil commitment and indeterminate sentencing 
instead of residency restrictions, registration, and monitoring, is that those 
individuals who have been identified as sexually violent predators are 
confined so that they do not have access to potential victims. Since 
approximately ninety percent of sex offenders are known to their 
victims
313
 and following incarceration may return to the homes where they 
committed the initial offenses, those that are at higher risk of seriously 
harmful reoffense are kept away from future victims. Instead of directing 
inefficacious laws against the small number of ―stranger‖ offenders, which 
 
 
amendments); see also People v. Shields, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 922, 925 (Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that 
the ―indeterminate term provisions of section 6604 apply to persons confined as SVP‘s for two-year 
terms under the former version of section 6604‖). 
 Myriad constitutional challenges were levied (and withstood) in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 
346 (1997), as the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, concluding 
that it did not violate due process or double jeopardy principles and that it was not an ex post facto 
law. The Court determined that the Act did not impose punishment, but instead ―permit[ted] 
involuntary confinement based on a determination that the person currently both suffers from a 
‗mental abnormality‘ or ‗personality disorder‘ and is likely to pose a future danger to the public.‖ Id. at 
371. However, the Hendricks decision was not clear as to the level of scrutiny that should apply to 
involuntary commitment proceedings. Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence pointed out that although the 
Kansas law met the constitutional requirements established by the Court‘s precedents, civil 
confinement cannot be used if the purpose is punitive and becomes ―confinement for life.‖ Id. at 372–
73 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The dissent agreed with the majority that the Act‘s ―definition of ‗mental 
abnormality‘ satisfies the ‗substantive‘ requirements of the Due Process clause,‖ but because treatment 
was not properly provided for a treatable condition, the dissent argued that civil confinement was ―an 
effort to inflict further punishment upon him‖ and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 373–74 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). 
 310. See Fitch, supra note 307, at 500. 
 311. See, e.g., Fitch & Hammen, supra note 34, at 37 (concluding that ―[s]pecial commitment 
laws aimed specifically at sex offenders may enhance public safety, but they wreak havoc on public 
mental health systems and strain constitutional principles‖). 
 312. Matthew V. Daley, Note, A Flawed Solution to the Sex Offender Situation in the United 
States: The Legality of Chemical Castration for Sex Offenders, 5 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 87, 88 (2008); 
see also Fitch & Hammen, supra note 34, at 36–37 (noting that a 1999 survey of mental health 
authorities indicated that fiscal impact was a significant factor in the failure of commitment legislation 
in some states); Lieb, supra note 287, at 54–56 (discussing increasingly high cost of civil commitment 
in Washington State). 
 313. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. 
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sweep far too many individuals into their scope of regulation,
314
 we hope 
that the truly dangerous individuals—whether they are stranger or 
relative—will be locked away.315 If we are going to rely on the state to use 
its police power to protect us against dangerous sex offenders, longer 
prison terms and civil confinement for SVPs will be a better alternative 
than residency restrictions and registration statutes. Otherwise, we are 
allowing the state to avoid accountability for sex offender recidivism by 
shifting the risk to the community to use registration and residency to 
protect themselves against SVPs and to sex offenders, who must choose 
between confinement and being subject to vigilantism.
316
 
Electronic surveillance through a GPS is a relatively new technology 
approach to monitoring sex offenders in order to address recidivism.
317 
While the GPS approach has been adopted by at least seventeen states 
since 2006,
318
 residency restrictions have been the more prevalent 
legislative choice, even though, as discussed above, critics have 
questioned the effectiveness of these residency restrictions in deterring sex 
offender recidivism.
319
 GPS monitoring has been used to help support the 
 
 
 314. One commentator has described individuals who are forced to register as sex offenders such 
as a twenty-six-year-old female who  
[a]t age seventeen . . . had consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old male[;] . . . a mother of 
five [who] was convicted as a party to statutory rape when her daughter became pregnant at 
the age of fifteen and she later allowed the boy who impregnated her daughter to move into 
their house[;] . . . and a twenty-three-year-old college student . . . [who as] a freshman in 
college . . . pled guilty to a sexual offense for inappropriately touching an adult female 
college friend while highly intoxicated at a freshman party. 
Jacqueline Canlas-LaFlam, Note, Has Georgia Gone Too Far—or Will Sex Offenders Have To?, 35 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 309, 309 (2008) (internal quotation omitted). 
 315. See Roy B. Lacoursiere, Evaluating Offenders Under a Sexually Violent Predator Law: The 
Practical Practice, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, 
JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, supra note 18, at 75, 77 (explaining that ―most definitions of an SVP 
generally require (a) prior conviction for a qualifying sexually violent crime, (b) some particular type 
or types of mental condition, and (c) a nexus between the mental condition and sexual (mis)behavior 
that causes the individual to be a significant risk to reoffend in a sexually violent way if released from 
confinement‖). 
 316. See Simon, supra note 37, at 314 (concluding that the state is giving up its role of using 
―scientific expertise to normalize the dangerously deviant‖ and instead using ―new policies [to] 
transfer the risk to two groups—sex offenders themselves, who may face permanent confinement or 
the risks of public lynching, and the individual citizens, community organizations, and families, who 
are expected to police themselves against sex offenders—with the role of the state reduced to that of 
facilitating protection through warnings‖). 
 317. See Foohey, supra note 39, at 281–82 (noting that ―GPS monitoring has been hailed as a 
valuable device to combat recidivism‖). 
 318. See id. at 281. 
 319. Id. at 281–83 (noting that residency restriction laws do not ―‗account for the fact that sex 
offenders are more likely to travel outside of their neighborhood to avoid recognition if they attempt to 
re-offend‘‖) (quoting Meghan Sile Towers, Note, Protectionism, Punishment and Pariahs: Sex 
Offenders and Residency Restrictions, 15 J.L. & POL‘Y 291, 319 (2007)). 
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domestic violence protective order system because it can be individually 
tailored and reduces the reliance on victims to report violations.
320
 
Questions remain about the constitutionality and efficacy of applying this 
technology to sex offenders;
321 
however, it is a viable alternative to 
residency restrictions and civil confinement.
322 
GPS monitoring allows 
individual tracking of sex offenders to determine whether they are entering 
zones of likely reoffense based on their individual characteristics and 
locations of concern, such as former victim locations, so that they can be 
stopped before the harm occurs.
323
 
As with extended prison terms and civil confinement, the fiscal impact 
of GPS monitoring is substantial.
324
 While GPS monitoring is certainly an 
alternative that allows for individual administration, it is only one tool 
available to law enforcement and will not necessarily allow the police to 
have complete control over sex offenders to prevent the recidivism feared 
by the public.
325
 
 
 
 320. Id. at 281 n.1. 
 321. See Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1322 (2008) (describing the 
Article as an examination of ―the generally unheeded intersection of two well-documented trends: the 
state‘s increasing desire to preventively regulate targeted classes of individuals and its increasing 
capacity to use innovative technologies, rather than physical incapacitation, to realize that desire‖); 
Zoila Hinson, Comment, GPS Monitoring and Constitutional Rights, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 285 
(2008) (concluding that the Massachusetts law authorizing GPS monitoring of sex offenders will likely 
be upheld as constitutional, as opposed to other states‘ statutes, because Massachusetts law requires 
individual tracking based on wearer identity and the area tracked). 
 322. See Foohey, supra note 39, at 283–84 (concluding that ―GPS monitoring [is] a compelling 
alternative to ineffective residency restrictions‖ and that initial studies have shown that monitoring 
decreases recidivism and allows police to apprehend sex offenders before the harm). 
 323. Id. at 284. 
 324. For example, California enacted Proposition 83, also known as Jessica‘s Law, after it was 
approved by seventy percent of the voters in 2006. Michael Rothfeld, Viability of Sex-Offender Law in 
Doubt, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2007, at A1. The law increased penalties for sex offenders, eliminated 
good time credits for early release, made simple possession of child pornography a felony, and 
established a lifelong GPS monitoring of High Risk Sex Offenders. CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., SEX 
OFFENDERS, SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS, RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS, AND MONITORING 
INITIATIVE STATUTE, PROP. 83, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/ 
proposition_83/entire_prop83.pdf (last visited May 13, 2009). Although law enforcement groups 
contend that the law is beneficial, it is unclear which agency or government unit is responsible for the 
monitoring and its associated financial burden. Rothfeld, supra. The cost per day to monitor a sex 
offender using GPS is estimated to be $33 a day, imparting a total cost to the state of about $90 million 
a year to monitor the approximately 9000 sex offenders on parole. Id. 
 325. Rothfeld, supra note 324 (citing a police department chief who testified that it is misleading 
for people to think that GPS monitoring is better than lifetime parole or probation since ―local police 
and sheriff‘s deputies are not trained to monitor criminals the way parole agents or probation officers 
do‖). 
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B. The Mental Illness Approach: Treatment 
Treatment of sex offenders should accompany all other alternatives if 
we hope to prevent or reduce recidivism once the offender leaves criminal 
or civil confinement.
326
 Indeed, treatment is constitutionally required when 
sex offenders are civilly committed because without treatment the 
confinement constitutes punishment and constitutional principles of 
double jeopardy and ex post facto laws are implicated.
327
 However, the 
efficacy of treatment is controversial,
328
 with some experts optimistically 
seeing hope in new methodologies and others ―pessimistically 
conclud[ing] that ‗there is little evidence that high-quality, state-of-the art 
treatments significantly reduce recidivism.‘‖329 These possible treatments 
include a cognitive-behavioral therapy known as relapse prevention and 
the less common approach of surgical or pharmacological castration to 
reduce the sex drive.
330 
Again, cost concerns are critical in looking at 
treatment alternatives since humane and therapeutic treatment is 
considerably more expensive than confinement or community monitoring 
through registration statutes, residency restrictions, or GPS monitoring.
331
 
 
 
 326. See Lacoursiere, supra note 315, at 89–91 (discussing treatment alternatives for SVPs). 
 327. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997); see also Janus, supra note 19, at 126–28 
(concluding that treatment is required for civil commitment, but permanent confinement may not be 
constitutional for those who are not treatable); Scott Gold & Lee Romney, Treatment Replaced by 
Turmoil, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A1 (reporting about the unrest in California‘s new state 
hospital in Coalinga for SVPs because patients do not believe they are receiving the treatment required 
to constitutionally confine them). For a look at the impact of the Hendricks decision, see John Kip 
Cornwell, Sex Offenders and the Supreme Court: The Significance and Limits of Kansas v. Hendricks, 
in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, 
supra note 18, at 197. 
 328. See, e.g., Rice & Harris, supra note 18, at 109 (―[T]he effectiveness of adult sex offender 
treatment has yet to be demonstrated.‖); Hanson et al., supra note 19, at 162 (observing that there is 
―no evidence that treatment reduced recidivism for sexual offenders‖); Harris & Rice, supra note 23, at 
207 (concluding that ―no studies of sex offender recidivism yet published have included treatments 
with substantial ability to lower recidivism‖). 
 329. Janus, supra note 19, at 119, 121 (quoting Roxanne Lieb, Vernon Quinsey & Lucy Berliner, 
Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 CRIME & JUSTICE 43, 93 (1998)). 
 330. Id. at 121. For information discussing the legal and ethical challenges regarding castration as 
treatment, see Robert D. Miller, Chemical Castration of Sex Offenders: Treatment or Punishment?, in 
PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY, 
supra note 18, at 249, 249; see also Daley, supra note 312. 
 331. Janus, supra note 290, at 256 (stating that ―[s]tate of the art treatment, provided in a humane, 
therapeutic environment is much more expensive than the standard punitive conditions of correctional 
institutions or even intensive supervision in the community‖); Rice & Harris, supra note 18, at 105–07 
(concluding that castration reduces sex drive and will likely result in reducing reoffending, but noting 
that ―no one has argued that castration is appropriate for the large proportion of sex offenders‖ and that 
few offenders agree to such treatment). 
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Until evidence is available to support the efficacy of various treatments 
for sex offenders to prevent recidivism, public policy must encourage 
confinement or police and community monitoring to reduce the risk to 
public safety.
332
 However, monitoring techniques such as registration and 
notification laws subject sex offenders to stigmatizing and psychologically 
damaging labeling, which may negatively impact therapeutic treatment by 
creating a sense of hopelessness and banishment from the community.
333
 
Instead, laws targeting sex offenders should offer treatment and 
monitoring based on individualized decisions to reflect risk management 
concerns so that individuals have the incentive to control their behavior.
334
 
Commentators have suggested other alternatives for addressing sexual 
offender recidivism such as sex offender reentry courts, restorative justice, 
community containment, and even ―island or wilderness colonies for long 
term prisoners.‖335 Sex offender reentry courts are specialized courts, 
similar to those used for drug treatment, and serve as the centerpiece for 
managing sex offenders through treatment supervision and accountability 
for individual behavior.
336 These specialized courts are ―a more cost-
effective strategy both for protecting the community and for rehabilitating 
sex offenders‖ and are particularly suited for addressing the eighty to 
ninety percent of sex offenses which are committed by perpetrators who 
know their victims.
337
 Restorative justice is similar to the reentry court 
model, but operates preconviction to involve victims in choosing how to 
address their violation through a victim-driven process and by 
―emphasiz[ing] offender accountability through reparations and 
rehabilitation rather than punishment.‖338 The community-containment 
 
 
 332. Harris & Rice, supra note 23, at 207–08 (concluding that since studies have not indicated that 
treatment lowers recidivism, management of sex offenders must utilize risk analysis to predict 
recidivism based upon psychological characteristics while searching for effective treatment 
methodologies). 
 333. Winick, supra note 284, at 329 (concluding that ―[i]nstead of subjecting sex offenders to 
psychologically damaging labeling and perpetual stigmatization, we should offer meaningful treatment 
and incentives that motivate them to accept treatment and to learn how to control their behavior‖). 
 334. Id. at 227; see also Janus, supra note 290, at 259 (concluding that risk assessment should 
focus on individual risk so that sex offenders are allowed freewill and given the opportunity to take 
individual responsibility for their actions). 
 335. Lee H. Bowker, Exile, Banishment and Transportation, 24 INT‘L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & 
COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 67, 73 (1980). 
 336. Durling, supra note 5, at 359–60 (describing how these courts rely on polygraph testing to 
monitor behavior and treatment, which serves a similar purpose as drug testing for drug abuse 
management). 
 337. See John Q. LaFond & Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Reentry Courts: A Cost Effective 
Proposal for Managing Sex Offender Risk in the Community, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 300, 301, 
318 (2003). 
 338. Mary P. Koss et al., Restorative Justice for Sexual Violence: Repairing Victims, Building 
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approach is similar to both restorative justice, in that it adopts a victim-
centered philosophy, and the sex-offender-reentry-courts model, because it 
involves criminal justice supervision, monitoring, and polygraph tests.
339
 
Community containment is a risk management and treatment approach 
that uses an interdisciplinary team of criminal justice officers, the 
judiciary, and treatment providers.
340
 These newest alternatives are 
innovative approaches to sex offender recidivism, which take into account 
the practical difficulties with confinement, treatment, and the inevitable 
risk of releasing sex offenders back into the community. 
CONCLUSION 
Sex offender residency restrictions effectively banish these locally 
undesirable and dangerous individuals from politically powerful 
communities because of the fear that they may reoffend in local 
neighborhoods. Although most sex offenses are committed by relatives or 
acquaintances of the victims, rather than by strangers, our public policy 
approach has been to focus on the stranger sex offender. This focus, while 
politically popular, does little to address continuing concerns about 
reoffense by these individuals. The current legislative approaches to sex 
offender recidivism include sex offender registration and residency 
restrictions, which impose responsibility on the public to protect children 
and others against disclosed, but unmanaged, risk. In addition, residency 
restrictions attempt to ―dump‖ these risks on unsuspecting communities or 
other states by effectively banishing these individuals. 
There is not yet sufficient evidence showing that residency restrictions 
are effective at preventing or reducing sex offender recidivism. In fact, 
there are grave concerns that these restrictions are forcing sex offenders 
into homelessness, hopelessness, and transience, making them even more 
dangerous to our communities because the tasks of accurate registration 
and subsequent monitoring become much too difficult and expensive. Not 
only do residency restrictions generate individual liberty constitutional 
challenges, such as ex post facto claims and takings claims, but banishing 
 
 
Community, and Holding Offenders Accountable, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 384, 388 (2003). 
 339. See Kim English et al., Community Containment of Sex Offender Risk: A Promising 
Approach, in PROTECTING SOCIETY FROM SEXUALLY DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND 
THERAPY, supra note 18, at 265, 268, 275 (observing that often ―well-intentioned community 
notification laws may have a devastating effect on the victim if the perpetrator is a family member, as 
often is the case‖). 
 340. See id. at 277; see also LaFond & Winick, supra note 337, at 310 (stressing the importance 
of polygraph testing to assist in risk management and the treatment process). 
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these individuals into poor minority neighborhoods and/or other states 
may implicate policy concerns similar to environmental justice and state 
protectionism, potentially invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause. 
Local and state legislators should seriously reexamine the current trend 
of using residency restrictions to address concerns about sex offender 
recidivism. Such regulations give the public a false sense of security 
against the stranger sex offender, but they do not address the much greater 
problem of sex offenses committed by the victims‘ relatives and 
acquaintances. Additionally, residency restrictions may exacerbate 
recidivism by forcing sex offenders into homelessness and by uprooting 
them from family or community support networks. Instead, public policy 
decision makers should look toward alternatives, such as individualized 
risk assessment and management of these individuals, so that public 
resources can be properly directed to confine, monitor, and treat those sex 
offenders most likely to commit serious reoffenses. 
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